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Preface
The colonization experience has served as a good experiment in history for iden-
tifying institutions as a main cause of economic development. Many scholars have
found a persistent influence of early institutions over time. However, the channels to
explain these persistent effects are still an ongoing field of research.
The idea that current formal institutions account for the majority of development
differences leaves several observed outcomes unexplained: Formal institutions have
changed in former colonies, or have replicated those in western industrialized coun-
tries, but most former colonies with extractive activities in the past still seem trapped
in underdevelopment equilibria. Development differences are also present within de-
veloping countries, where informality (or the fact of being outside the formal institu-
tional environment) is a prevalent feature among these countries. Finally, as extensive
scholarly work observes, same formal institutions can perform differently in different
cultural environments (Tabellini, 2010).
This dissertation consists of three related papers that highlight the role of social
capital and de facto institutions as channels for the well-known persistent effects of
historical institutions. Whereas one of these studies gives evidence on the long run
effects of de facto institutions present in colonial trade, the two other studies seek to
show how extractive or non-pluralist (exclusive) states can have a serious impact on
de facto institutions, so that they largely deviate from what is considered formal or
suited to the law (i.e. legal), and/or they imply a deterioration of social capital. When
formal institutions change, but their effects on de facto institutions are persistent, the
outcomes mentioned above can be better understood.
My research uses the Latin American context. The first paper models historical
evidence for Colombia on the emergence of informality as a consequence of an extrac-
tive colonial state, and provides empirical evidence of its long run persistence. In the
second paper I present a more recent case of state failure in Colombia with negative
effects on social capital. Finally, the third paper further emphasizes the importance
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of informal (de facto) institutions in order to understand colonial legacies in Latin
America by studying colonial overseas trade in Mexico. The following paragraphs
give an overview of each of these studies, corresponding to the main chapters of this
dissertation.
Chapter 1 presents the paper “Explaining Informality: Extractive States and the Persis-
tent Incentives for Being Lawless”. In this paper I argue that informality is not a recent
feature of underdevelopment, but an underlying historical cause of underdevelop-
ment today. The literature indicates that colonial extractive states caused underdevel-
opment through persistent bad institutions for property rights protection.1 I argue
that extractive states also caused underdevelopment through persistent incentives to
enforce property rights out of the law; in other words, they also created a persistent
gap between de jure and de facto institutions. I present supporting historical evidence
for the emergence of an informal sector due to a colonial extractive state, consider-
ing the region of Antioquia, a large gold producer under Spanish colonial rule, now a
Colombian department. The paper provides a theoretical model to understand what is
implied by this evidence, and reports empirical evidence of a persistent link between
colonial informal mining and current informality outcomes within Antioquia.
I use the fact that colonial informal miners only extracted gold from rivers (or
placer mines) and not from mountains. Therefore, exogenous variation in the treat-
ment comes from variation in the number of placer mines during the colonial period,
conditional on the total number of mines (which should capture the general effect of
the presence of this extractive activity). I find significant persistence of informality
that is not explained by persistent geographical conditions favoring informal produc-
tion. Variation in current informality outcomes is only driven by the number of placer
mines in the presence of a colonial extractive state. I then propose that persistence of
informality can be explained by the channels of social capital and state capacity.
The study “Political Inequality and the Origins of Distrust: Evidence for Colombia” is
developed in Chapter 2. This paper studies the effect of political exclusion on social
capital in Colombia, suggesting social capital as an important channel through which
political inequality has been central for Colombian economic development. With polit-
ical exclusion I refer to the extent to which political institutions do not allow groups to
access political power equally. I use the Colombian National Front agreement during
1958-1974 to test my hypothesis, as it institutionalized the political exclusion of non-
traditional parties in that country. Whereas it affected all regions at the same time,
1See Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002).
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it implied differential effects according to the municipalities’ initial political diversity.
The political exclusion treatment is measured by the electoral share of non-traditional
parties before the National Front. Outcome variables are given by survey measures
of social capital and electoral turnout, which are used in a cross-section and a panel
model, respectively.
I find that political exclusion imposed by the National Front may have led to less
trusting individuals today, to a higher perception of free riding behaviors and to lower
levels of electoral turnout. The cross-section approach controls for relevant observables
and unobservables at the region level. Results are robust to two alternative placebo
treatments that capture equivalent measures of the treatment for a recent period, and
they are also robust to a within-propensity-score analysis. I also find that a possible
channel through which political exclusion in the past may be able to explain social
capital in the present is distrust towards the state, whereas presence of violence in
treated municipalities does not seem to be a probable channel.
Finally, Chapter 3 presents the paper “The Long-Run Influence of Institutions Govern-
ing Trade: The Case of Colonial and Pirates’ Ports in Mexico”, which is joint work with
Jenny Guardado.2 In this paper we examine the long-term development impact of
overseas trade in colonial Mexico. We consider both formal and de facto institutions
governing this colonial activity: Spanish rule and pirates. They differ in the pres-
ence of state institutions accompanying commercial activities, which implied, on the
one hand, legal trade under a Spanish trade monopoly, an illegal trade conducted by
pirates, on the other.
We use self-compiled historical records on the location of piracy and Spanish ports
in New Spain (now Mexico) and avoid selection bias with several strategies. We con-
trol for unobservables among close neighboring municipalities, use the presence of
a colonial town as a proxy for municipal-specific characteristics and identify natural
harbors along Mexican coastlines as a source of exogenous variation in the possibility
to trade. We find that being a Spanish or pirate port in the colonial period significantly
led to less poverty, better access to basic utilities and a larger municipal taxing capac-
ity today. The positive piracy effect, although in many cases lower than the Spanish,
is interpreted as a strong support to the long term impact of trade, was it developed
legally or not. Free trade underlying piracy activities, as opposed to a trade monopoly
under Spanish rule, is considered a key factor to explain these findings. A positive im-
pact of piracy on other state capacity outcomes is however less clear than the Spanish
2See separate coauthors’ statement on the contributions of each of us to this project.
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effect, thereby giving support to the influence of early state institutions.
The bibliography for all three studies follows at the end of this dissertation.
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Chapter 1
Explaining Informality: Extractive
States and the Persistent Incentives
for Being Lawless
1.1 Introduction
Informality is one of the most salient features of developing countries. Recent
estimates indicate that the size of the informal economy in these countries is huge, on
average 40 percent of GDP, ranging from 14 percent to 70 percent of these countries’
economies.1 This has been an issue of concern, given the extensive negative effects that
informality imposes on economic growth. It leads to fiscal losses, insecure property
rights, uncertainty in markets, low public goods provision and low productivity of
labor; it also undermines governance and may be related with criminal activities.2
Informality is often understood as a by-product of other current underdevelopment
features, and its long run implications have not been extensively studied.
This study argues that informality is not a recent feature, but an underlying his-
torical cause of underdevelopment today, and that its roots go back to the coloniza-
tion era. The literature indicates that colonial extractive states established institutions
that deny property rights to the majority of the population, thereby hampering eco-
1See Buehn et al. (2010).
2For an analysis of the informal economy problem and its size see La Porta and Shleifer (2014) and
Buehn et al. (2010).
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nomic growth and perpetuating the institutional status quo.3 Resorting to historical
evidence and data, a theoretical model of informality under an extractive state, and
contemporary data for Colombia, I argue that extractive colonial states not only left
detrimental institutions for property rights, but also created long-lasting incentives to
secure property rights out of the law. In other words, extractive colonial states have
not only caused underdevelopment through persistent bad institutions, but through a
persistent gap between de jure and de facto institutions as well.
The idea that formal institutions today account for the majority of development
differences leaves several observed outcomes unexplained: Formal institutions have
changed in former colonies, or have replicated those in western industrialized coun-
tries, but most former colonies with extractive activities in the past still seem trapped
in underdevelopment equilibria. Development differences can be also found within
developing countries, where high levels of informality are often observed regardless
of relative prosperity in an area. Finally, as a large related literature observes, same for-
mal institutions can perform differently in different cultural environments (Tabellini,
2010).4 A persistent gap between de jure and de facto institutions, once created by
the devastating experience of an extractive state, can help understand the above men-
tioned observations.
In this paper, I present historical evidence of the emergence of an informal sector as
a consequence of an extractive state domination. This is the case of Antioquia during
the colonial period. The region of Antioquia, in the Viceroyalty of New Granada before
independence, now a Colombian department, was one of the main gold producers
among Spanish colonies.5 Registered gold production in Antioquia was not always
consistent with the abundance of gold observed. The literature suggests that this was
not a sign of an actual decrease in production, but the consequence of a “legality crisis
in the tax base” (Alvarez and Uribe, 1985, p. 92). An extractive state was clearly in
place in Antioquia with near absence of public goods investments and the imposition
of high taxes. As a consequence, a decline in formal colonial enterprises occurred, as
well as a growing number of informal miners extracting gold from rivers and evading
colonial taxes (Alvarez and Uribe, 1985; Poveda, 1981; Restrepo, 1888).
3As in the seminal works by Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
(2001, 2002).
4See also Putnam et al. (1993), Fukuyama (1996), Knack (2002), among others.
5The territory of Colombia as a whole had the largest cumulative gold production until 1875 among
former Spanish colonies (Alvarez, 1900).
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I proceed in three main steps in order to test my hypothesis: I analyze qualitative
historical evidence on informality among miners in Antioquia. I present a theoretical
model in order to understand the economic incentives leading to the outcomes ob-
served by the historical literature, namely, the emergence of an informal sector due
to a colonial extractive state and the availability of resources to be owned. Finally, I
provide empirical evidence for a persistent link between colonial informal mining and
current informality levels within Antioquia.
The model shows the influence of two colonization types on the relative profitabil-
ity between the formal and informal sectors. It predicts the emergence of an informal
sector of significant size in the presence of an extractive colonizer (with a high ex-
traction rate relative to a low provision of public goods), where this size depends, all
else equal, on the amount of resources that can be exploited outside the formal econ-
omy. This is useful to understand two simultaneous facts: Extractive colonial activities
did not lead to the same production equilibria in all areas; and even areas with full
employment can show very poor social outcomes.
The Antioquia region provides a scenario of a single extractive colonizer, with
variation in the size of the informal sector across areas: Historical records indicate that
informal miners in the colonial period worked in placer mines (gold found in rivers or
that has been transported by water), rather than vein mines (gold found in mountains).
This is explained by differences between these types of mines in the ease of extracting
gold and concealing factors of production. Thus, the availability of placer mines in
an area can be considered a necessary condition for the emergence of informality in
the past. I consult the number and type of colonial mines in a unique catalogue of
historic mines records from 1739 until 1900 for Antioquia. I take the number of placer
mines during 1739-1810 (72 years before independence) as intention-to-treat, and use
variation in this number across municipalities to test the persistence of informality in
a within-department setting.
After controlling for the overall number of colonial gold mines in the same period
(which should capture the effect of the number of slaves, the amount of gold in a given
place and the size of colonial settlements) and under different specifications, I find that
a larger number of colonial placer mines is significantly associated with a higher share
of individuals not affiliated to the health or pension system, with a lower probability
of employed individuals having a formal contract and with a higher probability that a
child is working or looking for a job. I further control for placer and total mines during
90 years after independence. Current informality outcomes are not driven by the
presence of placer mines in general; it is specifically the effect of colonial placer mines.
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This supports the idea that the possibility of becoming informal in the past under
an extractive state is an important determinant of current informality levels. Finally,
I test my hypothesis using two different smaller and more homogeneous samples:
One sample considers only municipalities with presence of colonial gold mining; the
second sample only includes municipalities with no gold today. Results lead to the
same conclusions. Interestingly, a higher overall number of colonial gold mines is
associated with less informality in terms of the different measures.
I propose two channels through which persistence in informality can be explained.
These are social capital and state capacity. The social capital channel is presented as
an extension of the model, where individuals are allowed to inherit cultural values
and social skills consistent with these values that are relevant to be productive in
each sector. Inherited social capital is a function of parental initial cultural values and
social skills, as well as of parental investments on social capital, which depend on
their choice of being in the formal or informal sector. Once generations of individuals
have developed rooted cultural values towards informality and have learned how to
be ‘successful’ out of the control of the state, they will still have incentives to stay in
the informal economy, even if profitability of the formal sector increases.
An alternative channel of persistence is state capacity. Following the literature on
this topic,6 weak states should have emerged in places where individuals could not
be easily taxed and kept under control. If weak states persisted over time, persistent
informality can be explained. I argue that the capacity of a state involves not only
its size, but its legitimacy and real ability to make individuals comply with the law.
Under this view, the evolution of state capacity is endogenous to social capital and
vice versa. Nevertheless, I test one dimension of the state capacity channel, namely,
state presence. I use number of colonial officials, presence of local colonial offices,
and the municipality’s year of foundation as exogenous sources of variation in the
current size of local states in an IV approach. These historical variables have the
expected relationship with the treatment, but evidence of an effect of state presence
on informality outcomes is not conclusive. Persistent states that are weak in their
performance and legitimacy seem a more likely channel.
The colonization experience has served as a good experiment in history for iden-
tifying institutions as a main cause of economic growth. The seminal works by Ace-
moglu et al. (2001, 2002) argue that extractive colonial activities have imposed a major
6Among others, Acemoglu (2005), Sánchez de la Sierra (2013), Besley and Persson (2009), Acemoglu
et al. (2014).
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obstacle to long run development by setting institutions that deny property rights to
the majority of the population, which can then explain very low saving and investment
rates, and thus backwardness after the Industrial Revolution. Several other studies,
also based in the Engerman-Sokoloff Hypothesis7, have found evidence for long last-
ing effects of specific colonial institutions, such as slavery (Nunn (2008), Acemoglu et
al. (2012)), the mita forced labor system (Dell (2010)), land tenure institutions (Banerjee
and Iyer (2005)), as well as of colonial activities resulting from different factor endow-
ments (Naritomi et al. (2012), Bruhn and Gallego (2012)). This paper contributes to
that literature by showing an additional possible channel through which these effects
on current development could be also explained, namely, through a persistent condi-
tion of anarchy created by the rational will to escape an oppressive law in the past.
There is also significant literature that draws attention to the paradox that coun-
tries with more abundant natural endowments display worse economic outcomes or
weaker democracies.8 This paradox, known as the resource curse, has been consis-
tently related to “dysfunctional state behavior” (Robinson et al, 2006, p. 448). In
a long run perspective, my study helps to understand this paradox among former
colonies or places that were once subject to an extractive state: The possibility of op-
erating out of the reach of such a state, provided by the abundance of resources, can
explain a persistent gap between formal and informal institutions that leads to poor
development outcomes.
Finaly, this research complements the literature that examines causes and conse-
quences of current informal economies. Several studies examine the effects of taxes
and state regulations on the size of the informal sector9. Changes in these policy in-
struments are not always associated with a reduction of the existing informal economy
(Bruhn (2008)) and well-functioning legal systems seem to play a central role (Dabla-
Norris et al. (2008)). Other literature sees formal and informal economies as largely
disconnected, where informality is foremost a by-product of poverty conditions such
as low human capital and productivity (La Porta and Shleifer (2014)).10 My paper is
different to the literature mentioned above because it looks at more structural features
7Engerman and Sokoloff (1997).
8See Robinson et al. (2006), Ross (1999), Sachs and Warner (1995) and Gelb (1986), among others, for
studies and evidence of this paradox.
9See de Paula and Scheinkman (2009), Dabla-Norris et al.(2008), Bruhn (2008), Monteiro and Assunção
(2006).
10See also Rauch (1991) and Harris and Todaro (1970).
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of informality and mechanisms of persistence. I conceive informality studied in these
papers as a sign of a more pervasive deviation from the legal order.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 1.2 analyzes historical evidence for the
Antioquia region. Section 1.3 presents the model. I report empirical evidence for
the persistence of informality in Antioquia in section 1.4, where I also describe the
empirical strategy and data. In section 1.5, channels of persistence are briefly reviewed
from the historical literature and state presence as a channel is empirically studied.
Finally, section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 The case of colonial gold mining in Antioquia-Colombia
This section presents historical evidence on how an informal sector emerged in
Antioquia during the Spanish colonial period, and it describes characteristics of both
the informal sector and the formal economy. This informs how I set up the model in
section 1.3.
1.2.1 Historical evidence for the emergence of informality
Gold mining was already present in the pre-colonial period along the Colombian
territory, but this activity did not likely induce informality for several reasons: Pre-
cious metals were demanded for artistic and religious purposes and they were con-
ceived as any other good to be exchanged (Alvarez and Uribe, 1985); the indigenous
social structure was accepted by its members and social status could not be gained
through the possession of gold.11
Why should extractive colonization have led to informality? First, colonization
brought a change in the conception and use of gold; gold was demanded as the almost
single means of exchange and it became the equivalent of wealth. Second, given
an extractive colonial state, a new hierarchical structure was forcibly imposed and it
established a highly unequal society. It is then logical to think that this colonial society
rewarded gold accumulation. On the other hand, colonial gold taxes were most likely
understood as an expropriation rate, given that they did not benefit the population,
and the colonial unfair social structure was not chosen by the society.
11Although indigenous people had very rudimentary techniques to access minerals, they were able to
accumulate a lot of them over time. These minerals were basically salt, coal, emeralds and gold. Provided
access to these minerals, mining was an activity shared by the tribe members.
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Historical literature points out the existence of informal miners and their increasing
number during the colonial period in Antioquia, where these miners were character-
ized by escaping the colonial control and evading gold taxes. Informal miners replaced
formal mining to a large extent: Formal mining, mainly based on slave work, was pro-
ducing in the second half of the 18th century about only one third of all gold (Poveda,
1981), and towards 1851, around 80% of all workers in the mining industry were free
informal miners. For this reason, the abolition of slavery in the Nueva Granada in that
year did not have a big impact in gold production (Restrepo, 1888).12
In the presence of informality, gold could not be completely located in its produc-
tion phase, but it was more likely found in its circulation, that is, in trade. Traders
received gold dust from transactions with informal miners and then had to convert
this gold into currency for further trading goods (Poveda, 1981). This amount of gold
dust was not necessarily equivalent to the amount of gold not molten by miners; it
was equivalent to what they changed with merchants, that was not used by the latter
in smuggling trade.13 Table 1.1 shows a decline over time, between 1670 and 1800, in
the share of molten gold by miners relative to that share for merchants. This behav-
ior indicates a decline in the miners’ contributions, as taxes were paid at the time of
melting, thereby suggesting the existence of illegal mining before the 18th century.
It is worth noting that illegality was already a concern for the colonial power in
1678, consistent with the picture shown in Table 1.1. An official communication signed
in Madrid in that year established the reduction in colonial gold taxes in the whole
territory of Nueva Granada. This was done provided the need to effectively set back
the “deeply rooted crime of not taxing gold ”(cited by Restrepo (1888), p.220).
Colonial extractive state and the emergence of informality.
Alvarez and Uribe (1985) claim that informal mining emerged in order to avoid
the high fiscal burden and lack of subsistence means that characterized districts with
big-mining enterprises. Mining districts did not properly develop other economic
sectors and thus the amount of agricultural goods demanded by the labor force was
not available (Colmenares, 1989; Poveda, 1981; Restrepo, 1888). It is even argued that
12The abolition of slavery in Antioquia was in 1813.
13Merchants were required to pay a gold tax since 1695. Although they were more likely forced to
stay in the formal sector due to their need of currency, Alvarez and Uribe (1985) also show evidence of
illegality in trade; that is, of smuggling by changing gold dust for unregistered foreign goods.
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no other industry, except for gold mining, was developed in Colombia during three
centuries of Spanish colonization (Alvarez, 1900). This is sign for the purely extractive
aims of the colonial power, which saw gold as the unique goal and disregard the
promotion of agriculture and trade for most of the colonial period.
The colonial fiscal burden was shouldered by enterprises that were legally identi-
fied by colonial offices that looked after tax collection - Cajas Reales. These enterprises
were singled out due to their visible geographical presence and they had to give 20%
of their total output to the colonial power, a tax called quinto real. Low returns given
a high fiscal burden, and the difficulties to sustain miners’ crews are considered two
of the main causes of the big-mining enterprise crisis (Alvarez and Uribe, 1985). Be-
sides, the lack of appropriate technologies, in particular, those needed for vein mines,
is also important to explain a low productivity in the formal sector (Alvarez, 1900;
Poveda, 1981; Restrepo, 1888). This is additional evidence of an extractive strategy
by the colonizer, by which mineral resources should be obtained at very low invest-
ments levels. The crisis of big-mining companies may have not only increased relative
returns of other activities, but as Alvarez and Uribe (1985) indicate, it released labor
force suitable for mining.
In sum, the historical evidence suggests a causal link between an extractive state
(high fiscal burden plus lack of subsistence means and technology) and the emergence
of an informal sector, through the channel of impoverishing the formal economy.
Informal miners’ characteristics: Why could they not be expropriated and their way
of production.
Informal miners were not hired by anyone and not tied to any specific place. They
were nomads and moved to places with an easy access to gold. They extracted gold
from rivers and, in particular, they used to look for dry rivers, which were easier to
exploit (Poveda, 1981; Restrepo, 1888). This mobility allowed them to obtain a certain
amount of gold, conditional on this mineral being present in rivers, even though there
were already other informal miners. Informal miners were able to move because they
mostly worked on their own, if not, with a small group of slaves taken away from
legal mines. The type of relationship between slaves and free men was different in the
informal sector. Free-men informal miners were often mulattoes and their work, as
well as their families’, was as important as that of slaves. Slaves could also participate
from gold output (Poveda, 1981).
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Production costs and investments were lower than those in the formal sector. In-
formal miners did not inform any authority about their work and did not typically
buy lands; therefore, they were also called invasive miners (Alvarez and Uribe, 1985).
Since they did not have any lasting place of work and did not display identifiable
factors of production for tax collectors (e.g. big crew of slaves), they could not be
taxed, nor restrained by the colonial power (Alvarez and Uribe, 1985).
Formal labor and the influence of public goods.
Formal miners worked in mines with a fixed and long-lasting geographical loca-
tion, hence identified by the colonial power. They were tied to a given place, where
big mines, either placer or vein mines, were exploited . Given the mines’ big size, a
large labor force was required. In the particular case of vein mines, it is also argued
that more complex technologies than the ones used would have been needed in order
to extract minerals in an efficient way (Poveda, 1981; Restrepo, 1888).
In this context, an adequate level of public goods would have a positive impact
on the formal sector productivity, since more labor could be attracted and maintained,
and technology would allow a more productive and lasting exploitation of mines. This
corresponds to the counterfactual of a non-extractive state in Antioquia. Public goods
provision was insufficient; as pointed before, agriculture and trade were not properly
developed during most of the colonial period and, hence, there was lack of subsistence
means relative to the size of the labor force. Since individuals were mainly forced to
work, there was no incentive to attract workers with better welfare conditions; yet,
given insufficient living conditions, part of the labor force died or escaped mines (Col-
menares, 1989). Investments needed for production, such as technology, were also low
or inexistent. Mines were still exploited with techniques learned from the indigenous
people and with the most rudimentary instruments. The colonial power neglected
the construction of roads and the establishment of river transportation means, which
also prevented the entry of machines necessary for the exploitation of mines. As a
result, the lack of appropriate technologies caused the desertion of many vein mines
(Alvarez, 1900; Colmenares, 1989; Poveda, 2002; Restrepo, 1888).
Contrary to the formal sector, productivity in the informal sector would not have
been likely affected by public goods provision. Informal miners would not easily ac-
cess these goods if they wanted to be out of reach of colonial authorities. For instance,
they would not be able to buy goods in a big market (if conditions for such a market
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were provided by the colonial state) using gold dust instead of coins. That would im-
ply being detected. Even if they could access public goods to some extent, the informal
sector, in the way it existed, did not need to attract labor and sustain big miners crews
in a given place and their work did not imply large investments.
1.2.2 Evidence for the long run persistence of informality
Colonial policies in Colombia began to change at the end of the colonial period.
Historical evidence reports adjustments in colonial gold taxes since the late 17th cen-
tury. On the other hand, agriculture and trade started to be promoted only at the end
of the 18th century, when there were signs of a more enlightened Spain (González,
1983). However, there is no evidence in Antioquia of a reversion in informality during
the colonial period, nor after independence: It is estimated that 60% of all gold pro-
duction was informal in the second half of the 18th century (Poveda, 1981), this share
was likely higher few decades after independence, when about 80% of all miners were
informal (Restrepo, 1888), and the present is not different from two centuries ago: Gi-
raldo and Muñoz (2012) find that about 80% of gold production in 2011 comes from
illegal enterprises in Antioquia.
Considering Colombian mining industry as a whole, it has been also characterized
by informality. Partial results from a mines’ census in 2011 indicate that 63% of all
identified mines are informal; in particular for Antioquia, this number rises to 79,1%.14
These high levels of informality, especially in the gold sector, have implications beyond
tax evasion and inferior job quality: Whereas some informal enterprises are run by
’artisan’ miners, some other have become a financing source for illegal armed groups,
either because these groups demand an output quota from existing informal miners
(Giraldo and Muñoz, 2012) or because they exploit labor directly (Ronderos, 2011).
Giraldo and Muñoz (2012) note that illegal gold mining is related with land property
informality and bad fiscal performance of local governments.
Informality in Antioquia is not only present in the mining industry. The function-
ing of other natural resource-based sectors, such as wood, displays clear deviations
from legal regulations (Giraldo and Muñoz, 2012). Considering all economic sectors,
informality in the labor market is of important magnitude, and measures of such in-
formality will be used as outcome variables in the empirical section.
14These results are partial since only around 50% of all municipalities have been examined by the
census. This census is carried out by the Colombian Ministry of Mines and Energy.
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1.3 A model to understand the emergence of informality
The colonizer and a continuum of individuals living in the colony are the players
of the game. They are placed in an area with plenty of resources. These resources can
be present in different forms or types in nature, according to which they can be more
or less easily exploited in an informal way. Let γ ∈ [0, 1] be the amount of resources
that are of the type exploitable for informal individuals, where total resources are
normalized to be equal to one. This source of variation provided by γ is captured in
the empirical strategy by the number of colonial placer mines.
The colonizer and individuals in society play in two stages.15 In the first stage
(t = 0) the colonizer chooses an expropriation rate, τ, and a level of public good
investment, g, which determine the degree of extraction of colonial institutions. These
institutions are persistent throughout the colonial period. In the second stage (t = 1),
individuals decide whether to be formal or informal according to individual payoffs
in both sectors, until an equilibrium is achieved.
Informal individuals perform productive activities for the economy, they do not
steal from the formal sector, but are not identified in this sector; that is, informal
individuals are not taxed, and they are not users of public and legal services. This
implies that any strategy chosen by the colonizer only affects the formal sector of the
economy: The colonizer can only expropriate individuals in the formal sector and the
public good can only affect production in that sector (can be only considered a public
good in the formal sector); i.e., it is not possible to avoid τ or to avoid being detected
if the individual is user of the public good.16 This public good may comprise housing,
development of markets for subsistence goods, and services or infrastructure like legal
services, education, roads, technology, among others.
1.3.1 Second stage
Individuals decide whether to be in the formal sector and be taxed, or to avoid
τ and work on their own (be informal). I consider that such a distinction between
sectors cannot be made in t = 0, as individuals do not know what it means being
under the colonial rule. Once everyone has been subject to this rule (or has been
15My setup follows the model fashion in Nunn(2007) to some extent.
16This is not only consistent with the observation that colonial informal miners retracted from places
where the main formal activity was established, but it is also in line with current literature on informality.
It is argued that firms pay taxes and bear regulation costs in order to have expanded access to public
goods, markets and financing sources (La Porta and Schleifer, 2008; 2014).
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formal in t = 0), a formal payoff can be observed versus the alternative of escaping the
colonial state. If it is more profitable to be out of the formal economy, individuals will
move to informality until relative payoffs make them indifferent between both sectors.
Denote the share of informal individuals in total population by Z.
All informal individuals can move their place of work so that they always secure
an individual profit, as long as there are resources to be exploited in an informal way
(γ > 0).
Total output produced by the informal sector at time t is given by:
YI,t(Zt) = γAI Zθt (1.1)
where θ ∈ (0, 1), and AI denotes total factor productivity in the informal sector.
Individual payoff in the informal sector is then:
ΠI,t =
γAI Zθt
Zt
=
γAI
Z1−θt
(1.2)
If γ = 1, all resources could be exploited in an informal way, and the informal
sector could realize the whole potential product, provided its production technology.
For γ = 0, it is not possible to exploit resources in an informal way and so payoff is
zero.
Total output produced by the formal sector at time t is given by:
YF,t(g, Zt) = AF(g) [1− Zt] (1.3)
where total factor productivity in the formal sector, AF(g), is affected by the public
good, and A′F(g) > 0. Note that the amount of resources that are also exploitable
for informal individuals (γ) does not affect production in the formal sector, except for
the fact that individuals can move to the informal sector. Note also that production
technology in the formal sector allows for constant returns to scale. Full replicability
of the production process is possible provided no limitations in the access to resources
and public goods. On the other hand, crowding effects are possible in the informal
economy since acting out of the law entails the need of being undetectable, and thus,
there is no open access to resources, even if these are the type that could be exploited
in an informal way.
Individual payoff in the formal sector is thus total production after extraction,
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divided by the number of formal individuals:
ΠF,t = [1− τ]AF(g) (1.4)
This payoff is increasing in g and decreasing in τ.
Finally, the colonizer payoff at a given time t is equal to extracted production minus
the cost of the public good, which is normalized to be equal to g:
Πc,t = τYF,t(g, Zt)− g = τAF(g) [1− Zt]− g (1.5)
Individuals are indifferent between being formal or informal if the following con-
dition holds:
1− γAI
AF(g)Z1−θt
= τ (1.6)
In particular, we can distinguish between a full informality equilibrium and an
interior equilibrium. A full informality equilibrium is achieved whenever:
1− γAI
AF(g)
≤ τ (1.7)
Let us consider the case of Antiquia mentioned in the previous section. There is an
extractive colonizer characterized by the almost absence of public goods investments
and the imposition of a tax rate (equivalent to the quinto real or 20% of total outout). I
will assume w.l.o.g. that AF(g) ≥ AI ∀g, thereby indicating that total factor productiv-
ity in the formal sector is at its lowest level when the absence of the state, in terms of
public goods, is comparable to that faced by informal individuals.17 Thus, considering
AF(g) = AI as the Antioquia case in (1.6), the decision to become informal depends
solely on how large is the extraction rate and how large are the possibilities to produce
out of the formal economy (given by the amount of suitable resources, γ, and the size
of the informal sector). This is depicted in Figure 1.1, where I plot payoffs in both
sectors and allow variation in the parameter γ.
17This condition guarantees that γAIAF(g) ∈ (0, 1] ∀γ 6= 0 in (1.7).
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Figure 1.1: Equilibrium depending on the level of γ (τ and g fixed)
[τ = 0.2, θ = 0.8, AF(g) = AI]
As can be seen, there will be incentives to become informal for a larger share of
the population, the higher is γ. This implies that places subject to the same colonial
extractive strategy and production functions can face different informality levels in
equilibrium depending on their resources’ characteristics: Where more resources can
be extracted easily by informal individuals, more people will be in the informal sector.
The persistence of these different informality levels is my testable hypothesis in section
1.4, where τ and g are given and constant across places, and γ varies exogenously.
The model also allows to think about the counterfactual of a non-extractive state.
As it is stressed by the historical literature, individuals were not informal because there
were rivers with gold, but they went to mine informally in these rivers because the
colonial state impoverished the formal sector. We can consider two types of colonizers
in Figure 1.2. Here γ is fixed, and I consider variation in the level of public goods
investment for the same τ.
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Figure 1.2: Equilibrium depending on the level of g
[τ = 0.2, γ = 1, θ = 0.8, AF(glow) = AI]
If there is the possibility to exploit resources out of the formal sector (γ > 0),
individuals will have incentives to become informal, but this high payoff will fall
rapidly as they have to compete for resources. If the colony is under a non-extractive
colonizer (that is, g is high), individual payoff in the formal sector will be high enough
to make individuals indifferent between sectors at a very small Z level. This yields
a stable low informality equilibrium Z∗low. If the colony faces an extractive colonizer,
formal payoff is low, and Z can grow until a full informality equilibrium, Z∗ = 1,
depending on γ and τ. This equilibrium is also stable.
1.3.2 First stage
In the first stage, the colony can face either a far-sighted or a short-sighted colo-
nizer, which determines his degree of extraction. The colonizer maximizes his total
payoff over the present and future period:
1
∑
t=0
δtΠc,t = Πc,0 + δΠc,1 (1.8)
where δ < 1 is the factor by which the colonizer discounts his payoff in the future.
Provided γ > 0, Πc,0 is higher than Πc,1, as Z = 0 in t = 0. Once τ and g are observed,
an informality equilibrium is achieved and the colonizer payoff in the future will be
affected by this Z level. Hence:
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1
∑
t=0
δtΠc,t = τAF(g)− g + δ (τAF(g) [1− Z1(τ, g, γ)]− g) (1.9)
Consider a strategy (τss, gss), such that ΠI > ΠF ∀Z, versus a less extractive strat-
egy (τ f s, g f s), for which ΠI > ΠF ∀Z is not fulfilled. (τss, gss) then satisfies:
1− γAI
AF(gss)
< τss (1.10)
Under (τss, gss), the colonizer total payoff will be:
τss AF(gss)− gss − δgss = Πssc,0 − δgss (1.11)
as Z(τss, gss, γ) = 1 in t = 1. Note that the colonizer is incurring losses for the
future period, as long as he wants to stay in the colony. This can be explained by
the need to maintain a military and state infrastructure, without which the colonizer
would not be able to stay.
It can be shown that this payoff is higher than any other obtained with a less
extractive strategy (τ f s, g f s) if δ satisfies:18
δ <
Πssc,0 −Π
f s
c,0
Π f sc,1 + gss
= δ̌ (1.12)
I thus call (τss, gss) a short-sighted strategy, and (τ f s, g f s) a far-sighted strategy. A
far-sighted colonizer (with δ > δ̌) will optimally choose to be less extractive in order
to obtain gains in the future period, whereas a short-sighted colonizer will care about
his present payoff, thus leading the economy to a full informality equilibrium Z∗ = 1
after that.
1.3.3 Channels of persistence
In this subsection I aim to outline two channels through which we can understand
the persistence of informality.
18δ̌ is in the relevant range for 0 < Πssc,0 −Π
f s
c,0 < Π
f s
c,1 + g
ss.
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Social capital formation
The first proposed channel is social capital formation. Consider individuals living
two periods. In the first period they are born and inherit from their parents a stock
of social capital, which is defined by cultural values and social skills consistent with
these values. This stock is comprised of a stock of values/skills towards formality and
a stock of values/skills towards informality.19 Denote it by φ = {φF, φI}. In the second
period, individuals decide whether to be formal or informal according to individual
payoffs in both sectors. At the end of this period, individuals have deepened values
and increased social skills for the sector they chose to be, and inherit their stock of
social capital to their children. In other words, φ depends on parents’ decision to
be formal or informal in the previous period, and on parents’ intial social capital;
therefore, the social capital formation function for any sector S ∈ {F, I} can be written
as:20
φS,t = f (φS,t−1, ΩS,t−1) (1.13)
where ΩS,t−1 are investments in social capital relevant for sector S that are realized
while being in sector S in period t− 1; f ′(ΩS,t−1) > 0.
Total factor productivity in any given sector is now determined by a social capital
component and a sector specific component. That is, individual payoffs depend on
each sector’s characteristics (that are common to all individuals), as well as on the
individual’s cultural values and social skills relevant to every sector. The intuition
behind the social capital component is that stronger cultural values make individuals
prone to put more effort on activities that are consistent with these values, and social
skills give the know-how to be successful in a given sector.
Total output produced by the informal economy is now:
YI,t(Z) = γAI ¯φI,tZθt (1.14)
where
¯φI,t =
1
Zt
∫ Zt
0
φiI,tdi (1.15)
19For example: Knowing how to lie when reporting income without being detected is a social skill
consistent with cultural values that favor informality.
20This is in line of the skills formation setting in Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010).
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is the general level of social capital relevant for the informal sector (i denoting indi-
viduals).
Individual payoff in the informal sector is then given by:
ΠiI,t =
γAIφiI,t
Z1−θt
= φiI,tΠI,t (1.16)
Equivalently, individual payoff in the formal sector can be written as:
ΠiF,t = φ
i
F,tΠF,t (1.17)
Consider that an informality equilibrium Z∗ ∈ (0, 1) is achieved in t = 1. This im-
plies that from that period onwards, everything else constant, two types of cultural
values and social skills (social capital) will develop in the population; one type that is
relevant to be productive in the formal sector and another type that is relevant to be
productive out of the law.
The older becomes a dynasty in the informal sector, the higher is the accumulated
stock of informal values/skills relative to formal ones. Figure 1.3 shows payoffs for
individuals that moved to the informal sector (thus only accumulated social capital
for that sector). The graph on the right hand side introduces a change at time T from
a low to a high payoff in the formal economy, Π
′i
F = φ
i
F,0Π
′
F. A higher profitability in
the formal sector can be produced, for instance, by the start of an independent state.
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Figure 1.3: New equilibrium after a change in the formal economy
[γ = 0.7, θ = 0.8, AF(g) ≥ AI , φiI,T > φiI,T−1 > ... > φiI,0 = φiF,0]
This change in the formal economy would move back a large share of individuals
to the formal sector in a scenario of no social capital formation. Yet, here, informal
individuals and their dynasties have done a sufficient amount of investments in their
informal values and social skills. As a consequence, only a very small portion of in-
dividuals would have incentives to move into the formal economy, while the majority
will still perceive a higher payoff in the informal sector. Therefore, a high informality
equilibrium persists.
State capacity
Persistence of informality can be also explained by persistent weak institutions
for law enforcement. The extent to which the colonial state was present in a given
territory, had control over its population and was legitimate may have persisted over
time and translated into local state capacity, even after independence from the colonial
power.
Literature on state capacity indicates that tax rates are proportional to the ability
of states to tax people.21 The larger is the share of population for which a state can en-
force tax payment, either because of legitimacy or violent coercion, the higher should
we expect those taxes to be. The level of taxes may not only provide a hint of the ca-
pacity of a state to raise taxes, but also a measure of the amount of potential revenues
21See Acemoglu (2005), Sánchez de la Sierra (2013), Besley and Persson (2009), Acemoglu et al. (2014).
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that could be invested in state infrastructure and public goods.
In the context of the model in this section, the value for τ that maximizes the
colonizer total payoff in (1.9) must satisfy the following f oc:22
τ∗ =
1
Z′τ
[
1
δ
+ 1− Z(τ, g, γ)
]
(1.18)
τ∗ is decreasing in δ, Z and Z
′
τ, where Z
′
τ is the expected response of Z by the
colonizer to a marginal increase in τ (it can be shown that the level of informality in
equilibrium, Z∗, is increasing in τ). For a given discount factor δ, a higher expected
informality equilibrium or a higher Z
′
τ will lead to a lower optimal extraction rate.
It can be also shown that Z∗ and Z∗
′
τ are increasing in γ. This implies that a higher
observed level of γ leads, ceteris paribus, to a lower optimal τ.23
Predictions of the model are then consistent with a state capacity channel. We can
assume that states after independence will have the same incentives as the colonial
state, except for those reflected in δ. Whereas it is expected that an independent state
has a much higher δ than any colonial state, given this δ, places for which a higher
informality has been observed should be the ones where weaker states emerge and
persist. A limited capacity to raise taxes implies a limited presence of the state in
terms of public goods. In this way, individual payoff in the formal sector, even under
a new state, will not be likely high enough to significantly reduce informality.
1.4 Empirical evidence for the persistence of informality
In the following, I present empirical evidence for a persistent link between colonial
informal mining and current informality levels in Antioquia. As historical evidence
points out, informal or illegal miners worked in placer mines, rather than vein mines,
given their ease for being exploited. Hence, the availability of placer mines in an
area can be considered a necessary condition for the emergence of informality in the
past. I will then use an intention-to-treat approach, taking variation in the number of
colonial placer mines across municipalities as variation for intensity assignment in the
colonial informality treatment. As outcome variables, I will use three measures of cur-
rent levels of informality across municipalities or households in Antioquia. Note that
22Second order condition guarantees that τ∗ is a maximizing value.
23In the case of colonial Antioquia, an average γ should have been considered in order to set a single
τ.
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the Antioquia case allows variation in the possibility to become informal in the past,
while keeping the nature of the colonizer constant across areas, namely, an extractive
colonizer.
The number of placer mines before independence comes from historical mines
records in the Antioquia region at the municipality level during 1739-1810 (72 years
before independence). Although registered mines were not necessarily those exploited
in an illegal way, they provide the only hint of an area’s gold richness and the way
this richness was available, if in rivers or mountains.
The treatment may proxy other features in the past that are important for later out-
comes, such us the size of colonial settlements and the number of slaves. One strategy
would be to control for population and its composition during the colonial period,
however, these data are not available at the municipality level. Alternatively, the total
number of gold mines can serve as an even better proxy for the above mentioned fac-
tors. Therefore, the baseline model below includes total number of mines in the same
period (1739-1810) at the municipality level. In this way, the number of placer mines is
not capturing the overall effect of colonial mining on current informality, but the effect
of extractive colonization that goes through the potential of being informal in the past.
The baseline model is given by:
Iij = α + β placer mines1739−1810 j + λ total mines1739−1810 j + W ′ijη + X
′
j ϕ + Uij (1.19)
where index i denotes individuals and index j refers to the corresponding municipality
for individual i. I is a current informality outcome, placer mines is total number of
placer mines during 1739-1810, total mines is total number of gold mines in the same
period, W is a vector of individual controls and X is a vector of observables at the
municipality level.
1.4.1 Data description
Data on the number of gold mines and their type were consulted in a unique
catalogue of historic mines records from 1739 to 1900 for Antioquia. This catalogue
was compiled by Mesa (1906). Figure 1.4 shows a map of Antioquia, where total
number of mines and number of placer mines in 1739-1810 can be visualized across
municipalities.
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Figure 1.4: Map of Antioquia displaying colonial gold mines and the intensity of the
treatment (number of colonial placer mines).
I observe the following informality outcomes: Whether a child24 is working or
looking for a job (child labor), whether an employed individual has a formal contract
(formal employment contract), and the share of employed individuals registered by the
Colombian Ministry of Health and Social Protection that are not affiliated to the health
or pensions system (no health or pension system). The first two variables come from the
2006 Colombian household survey -Encuesta Continua de Hogares- performed by the
Colombian National Administrative Department of Statistics, DANE. This survey con-
tains a representative sample of individuals in Antioquia (49298 in 41 municipalities).
Urban residency and literacy of the individual are taken as control variables from this
survey. The third outcome is available for all 125 municipalities in Antioquia in year
2008.
24Child defined between 0 and 17 years old.
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I divide observables in two sets of control variables. The first set includes relevant
geographic characteristics of municipalities, namely, (log) altitude, presence of a river,
as well as presence of gold, coal, and oil in 2002. The original source of these variables
is the Geographic Institute Agustin Codazzi - IGAC. The aim of using this set of
controls is to capture development differences related to the way that economic activity
is organized, and to exclude the effect of currently available resources (including gold
and rivers) on informality outcomes.
The second set of control variables comprise current socioeconomic characteris-
tics at the municipality level. The Colombian National Administrative Department of
Statistics (DANE) is the main source for these variables, and most of them are taken
from the latest census in 2005. These are: population size, share of urban population,
share of immigrants from other municipalities, share of forced migration, share of the
population that belongs to an ethnic group, literacy rate, share of individuals with
secondary/university education and employment rate. Unobserved features related
to remoteness and historical development are captured by distance to the department
capital city, and additional variables include mean unsatisfied basic needs index (1985-
2002), population density and presence of indigenous population in the first half of the
16th century; these variables were provided by the Center of Economic Development
Studies (CEDE) at Universidad de los Andes. Finally, I further add the presence of
FARC and ELN guerrilla groups (1993-2010), the presence of AUC paramilitary group
(1993-2010)25 and mean coca-farmed area (2000-2008) in this set of controls, given the
need to account for the effects of violence and delinquency activities related to illegal
armed groups. Data on the presence of these groups is reported by the Colombian
Presidency Observatory of Human Rights, and the original source for coca-farmed
area is the Colombian National Department of Narcotics. These data were also pro-
vided by the CEDE.
It is worth noting that to the extent that these control variables are arguably en-
dogenous to historical informality, including them in the estimation implies ‘overcon-
trolling’ and likely leads to underestimate the coefficient of interest.
Descriptive statistics of all variables are shown in Table 1.2. Additionally, Table 1.2
presents a comparison of the balancedness of these covariates across treatment status.
Municipalities are defined as treated, for the purposes of this table, if they had a posi-
tive number of placer mines in the colonial period 1739-1810. It can be observed from
25Presence of illegal armed groups are binary variables that inform if there is prevalence or not of these
groups during the period 1993-2010.
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a mean comparison test that municipalities in Antioquia are homogeneous between
treatment and control group in terms of socioeconomic characteristics. The only sig-
nificant difference in means is present in the distance to the department capital city,
which is explained by the fact that places with colonial state presence have had a
greater historical importance (and thus are closer to the capital city, or are the capital
city itself).26 This can be confirmed by considering historical state presence variables27,
also reported in the table; they indicate a significantly higher presence of the colonial
state and an earlier municipality’s foundation year in treated municipalities. Finally,
the mean comparison test indicates that treated municipalities have on average more
mines before and after independence, are at a higher altitude, and a higher share of
them has presence of gold today. In sum, it is reasonable to conclude that municipal-
ities with colonial placer mines compared with all other municipalities in Antioquia
are quite homogeneous in terms of socioeconomic observables; they are, not surpris-
ingly, different in geographical characteristics mostly related to gold richness, as well
as historical variables. I control for these characteristics in my regressions.
1.4.2 Results and robustness checks
Table 1.3 shows OLS estimates for the baseline model. The first column under each
dependent variable features no control variables; the second column includes only
geographic characteristics mentioned above, while the set of socioeconomic control
variables is added in the third column.
Conditional on the total number of colonial gold mines, a larger treatment is related
to a higher share of individuals not affiliated to the health or pension system, to a
lower probability of having a formal contract if employed and to a higher probability
that a child is working or looking for a job. The treatment effect is significant under
different specifications (with/without controls) and its sign remains stable in cases of
no statistical significance.
Considering specifications that only control for geographical observables, one stan-
dard deviation increase in the number of colonial placer mines (equal to 2.2428 mines)
is related to an increase equivalent to 25% of one standard deviation in the share of
26This difference in means thus disappears when only municipalities with colonial gold mining are
considered. See Table 1.10 in the Appendix for descriptive statistics and balancedness among control and
treatment municipalities with colonial mining history.
27These variables are described in section 1.5, where the channel of state presence is empirically stud-
ied.
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non-affiliated individuals, to a decrease equivalent to 20% of one standard deviation
in the formal employment contract variable, as well as to an increase equivalent to
41% of one standard deviation in the child labor variable.
Interestingly, a larger total number of colonial mines is associated with lower levels
of informality throughout the different measures.
[Table 1.3 here]
Robustness checks
Results above indicate there is a significant link between placer mines in the colo-
nial period and current informality outcomes. This can be suggestive evidence for
the persistence of informality since colonial times; nevertheless, this evidence would
be also consistent with the idea that placer mines provide in general favorable condi-
tions for informality. In particular, in today’s developing countries, low quality institu-
tions and other underdevelopment features may allow the emergence of informality in
places where placer mines are available. According to the literature, however, current
gold production in Colombia from colonial gold deposits can be considered insignifi-
cant as these deposits are now empty (Acemoglu et al., 2012). Thereby, current placer
mines should not be related with the treatment.
On the other hand, there may be still the concern that the estimated effect captures
something related to placer mines in the past (which are more likely correlated with
the treatment), but not necessarily the effect of placer mines during the colonial period.
In order to rule this out, Table 1.4 includes number of placer mines and number of total
mines during the next 90 years after independence (1811-1900)28 in each municipality.
If informality emerged in the colonial period and has persisted since then, variation in
the number of colonial placer mines should still explain variation in informality today,
after controlling for placer and total mines after independence. Results show that it
is not a general effect of placer mines the one driving current informality outcomes;
colonial placer mines are persistently related to informality, while placer mines after
independence are not significant to explain these outcomes. The treatment effect is
now significant in all specifications with formal employment contract and child labor
as dependent variables, and it has a larger magnitude.29
28Independence battles started around 1811 and Antioquia was self-declared independent in 1813, as
many other Colombian regions, although definitive independence of Colombia was achieved in 1819. I
take 1810 as the independence threshold in order to have a more conservative measure of colonial mines.
29Estimates from specifications only controlling for geographical features indicate a decrease equivalent
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[Table 1.4 here]
An additional robustness check considers only municipalities with presence of
colonial gold mining. This is meaningful as these municipalities may share many un-
observed characteristics that make them different from municipalities with no mining
industry in the colonial period. They have a longer common history of state presence,
early settlements and gold exploitation, but still differ in the amount of resources suit-
able for informal extraction. Results for this reduced sample are reported in Table 1.5.
The colonial placer mines treatment is still robust under specifications with no controls
and all control variables, whereas it is not statistically significant to explain the share
of individuals not affiliated to the health or pension system.
[Table 1.5 here]
Finally, I perform regressions taking only municipalities with no gold today. This
exercise seeks to clarify any concern that informality levels are driven by persistent
geographical conditions favoring informality, and not only by the fact that such condi-
tions under a colonial extractive state created a persistent gap between the legal order
and reality. Besides, municipalities with gold today may be different in many dimen-
sions that we would like to exclude. Estimates are shown under odd columns of Table
1.6 and results lead to the same conclusions as before.
Even columns in this table report estimates for the whole sample, and they replace
the original treatment by the share of placer mines in total mines in 1739-1810. The
intuition provided by historical evidence suggests that the extensive margin should
have been of major importance, given the need of informal miners to be out of reach
of the colonial state. Therefore, the number of available placer mines, and not the
share of placer mines, should have explained variation in the size of the informal
sector during the colonial period. Results confirm this intuition since the coefficient
for the share of placer mines is not significant, contrary to the treatment effect in Table
1.4.
[Table 1.6 here]
to 47% of one standard deviation in the formal employment contract variable, and an increase equivalent
to 52% of one standard deviation in the child labor variable, due to one standard deviation increase in
the treatment.
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1.5 Investigating the channels of persistence
How can we explain such a long persistence of informality? In the model in sec-
tion 1.3 I suggest two possible channels: Social capital and weak state capacity. Social
capital formation over generations can be highly influenced by past experiences. Indi-
viduals whose dynasties have only learned how to live out of the control of the state,
will have internalized inherited values as their own and social skills as habits; as a
result, these individuals will remain more likely in the informal economy, thereby in-
creasing their social capital towards informality. In sum, we can think that the past
experience of an extractive state, and the extent to which it could be avoided, gave rise
to the formation of different types of deeply-rooted behavior.
An alternative channel of persistence is state capacity. I argue that the capacity of
a state involves not only its size, but its legitimacy and real ability to make individuals
comply with the law. If individuals have incentives to escape the law and are able to
conceal production, the state has by definition a reduced capacity; moreover, under
theses conditions, incentives to build state presence and undertake investments are
low, provided low expected returns in the future. Hence, the pesistence of weak states,
once in the past determined by the existence of an informal sector, can then explain
persistent levels of informality today.
These two channels can be seen as two sides of the same story, where the devel-
opment of each channel is endogenous to the other: Informal behavior reduces the
ability of a state to control its population and influences de facto institutions, thereby
affecting the way that formal institutions perform; on the other hand, weak states are
not fully able to enforce the law and this allows the presence of informality. Neverthe-
less, it seems worth disentangling the independent effect of each channel on current
outcomes. Since exogenous sources of variation for cultural values or behavior (in-
dependent from institutions) are unsual to find,30 I test one dimension of the state
capacity channel, namely, state presence. At the end of this section, I come again to
the historical literature in order to complement the understanding of these channels.
I use measures of colonial local state presence, as well as the municipality’s year of
foundation, as exogenous sources for local state presence today. First, it is reasonable
to assume that they are sources for the development of state presence since colonial
state infrastructure was likely taken on after independence, and it allowed to build
easily on a previous state. On the other hand, the municipality’s year of foundation can
30I cannot identify second generation immigrants in my data; they could be otherwise considered in
an epidemiological approach.
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proxy the degree of consolidation of its local state.31 We can believe these sources are
exogenous as these variables are not affected by current informality levels, although
they should in fact be affected by colonial informality in order to be valid as a channel.
I first check the relationship between these measures and the treatment; then I report
reduced form regressions; finally, I use these measures as instruments for a current
measure of local state presence, controlling for colonial placer mines in both stages of
the IV estimation.
Historical data of Spanish colonial state presence are documented by Durán y Dı́az
(1794). From these records, Acemoglu, Garcı́a-Jimeno and Robinson (2012) have com-
piled municipality-level data on the number of colonial officials and the presence of
several local state offices, namely, post office, alcabala-tax (sales tax) collection agency,
as well as agencies in charge of managing state monopolies over tobacco, playing
cards, liquor and gunpowder; indicators on the presence of local state offices are ag-
gregated in a single index. I will use the number of colonial officials and the index
(colonial state presence) as measures of colonial state presence.
In Table 1.7 I study the relationship between historical presence of local states
and the treatment, where I only control for observables in the colonial period (total
gold mines in 1739-1810 and presence of native population in the first half of the
16th century) and altitude, which is time-invariant. I find that the treatment, i.e. the
number of placer mines, is in general related to a lower number of colonial officials
and a lower index of colonial state presence, although it is only significant to explain
the latter outcome. A larger treatment is also associated with a later foundation year,
but this relationship is not statistically significant. The sign of the coefficients for the
treatment goes then in line with a state presence channel. On the other hand, a higher
total number of gold mines is significantly associated with a larger state presence and
an earlier foundation year. This is also in line with results from the previous section,
where total gold mines can explain lower informality levels.
[Table 1.7 here]
In Table 1.8 I include the same historical measures of state presence as explanatory
variables for informality outcomes. Columns (1), (4) and (7) only include these mea-
sures, whereas the remaining columns include both the treatment and the measures
for the proposed channel. If informality during the colonial period is solely operating
31These years can be found in Credencial Histórica (2001) and are also documented by the Antioquia
departmental government.
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through the channel of a lower state presence, historical measures of state presence
should be negatively associated with informality levels today and they should remove
the effect of the colonial placer mines treatment. Estimates indicate, however, that
variables of colonial state presence are generally not significant to explain informal-
ity outcomes, while a later municipality’s foundation year is significant to explain a
lower probability of child labor, which is not the expected relationship. Direction and
significance of the placer mines treatment effect remain unchanged.
[Table 1.8 here]
In an additional exercise, I use a current measure of local state presence in order
to verify this channel. Data on state presence at the municipality level in 1995 are
available from a detailed study developed by Fundación Social, a Colombian NGO,
that covers all municipalities in Antioquia. I build a measure of local state presence,
as the mean of per capita local public employees, tax collection offices, deed registry
offices, notary offices, public health centers, health posts and public schools. This
measure (local state presence 1995) is used as explanatory variable in Table 1.9.32 Given
that current state presence is endogenous to informality levels today, I use historical
state presence variables from the previous exercise as instruments. I report in Table 1.9
first stage regressions, as well as second stage and OLS estimates for every outcome
variable. I control for placer and total colonial mines, mines after independence and
the set of geographic characteristics.
OLS estimates indicate that current state presence is associated with lower infor-
mality levels, and this relationship is significant considering the share of non-affiliated
individuals as dependent variable. Nevertheless, state presence is no longer signifi-
cant under the IV estimation. It must be noted that historical state presence measures
are weak instruments. In this scenario, conventional inference may be misleading;
therefore, I further perform a robust significance test33 of the coefficients on local state
presence in the second stage. It suggests that local state presence is significantly asso-
ciated to a higher probability of child labor.
Placer mines during the colonial period are mostly significant under OLS or IV
estimates (not as explanatory variable for individuals not affiliated to the health or
32I also consider tax revenue per capita (Table 1.11) and the share of tax revenue in total municipal
revenues (Table 1.12) as explanatory variables in the Appendix. I obtain similar results to those mentioned
here.
33I perform the Conditional Likelyhood Ratio test (CLR) suggested by Moreira (2003) and Andrews et
al. (2006).
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pensions system), and the coefficients’ sign and magnitude remain stable.
[Table 1.9 here]
In sum, there is no conclusive evidence in favor of physical presence of the state
as a channel. State capacity, as defined at the beginning of this section, may be a more
likely channel, which definitely depends on the de facto institutions governing the
performance of the state. Under this broader definition, the channels of social capital
and state capacity are no longer separable; however, the historical literature can pro-
vide important insights on the way informal behaviors greatly affected the functioning
of institutions. It notes, although very briefly, several events in which informality im-
plied changes beyond the mining industry and tax evasion. One important change
occurred in slavery: Whereas slavery was abolished in 1813 in Antioquia (38 years
before than in the whole country), there were already registered volunteer liberations
of slaves since the end of the 18th century, despite those liberations being considered
’subversive’ by colonial authorities (Poveda, 1981). Other events were related to an
improved political representation of creoles (Spanish descendants born in the colony)
and an increased power of miners and merchants. Creole people became a majority in
the Medellı́n administrative council -cabildo- since 178934, and policies applied by this
council reflected prevalent miners’ interests, even going against the colonial law. The
illegal regulation of prices in the benefit of miners is one example of permeability in
the functioning of institutions to informal behaviors. It is also known that there was
no penalty applied by local justice when merchants openly refused to pay gold taxes
between 1786 and 1803 (Alvarez and Uribe, 1985).
1.6 Conclusion
This paper argues that informality is not a recent feature of underdevelopment, but
an underlying historical cause of underdevelopment today, which emerged as a reac-
tion to escape an oppressive extractive state in the past. I present historical qualitative
evidence for the emergence of an informal sector due to a colonial extractive state,
considering the case of Antioquia, a large gold producer under Spanish colonial rule,
now a Colombian department. I provide a theoretical model in order to understand
the economic incentives leading to this outcome observed by the historical literature.
34Twinam (1985), cited by Alvarez and Uribe (1985), p. 75.
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Finally, I find empirical evidence for a persistent link between colonial informal min-
ing and current informality levels within Antioquia. I argue that informality has been
persistent through the channels of social capital formation and weak state capacity.
The emergence of informality as a consequence of extractive states is interesting in
the light of the economics literature, as it implies that these states not only set condi-
tions for institutions that deny property rights to the common people, but also give
incentives to enforce property rights out of the law. In particular, it implies that colo-
nial extractive states in the past may have not only caused underdevelopment through
persistent bad institutions, but also through a persistent gap between de jure and de
facto institutions. Thus, the argument in this study sheds light on structural features
and mechanisms of persistence of informality. Findings in this paper also highlight
how the abundance and type of resources were important to enable individuals to
escape the state, produce outside the formal economy and consolidate an informal
sector in the past.
Informality can be understood as a response to overcome the negative effects of
extractive institutions, that is, as a response to avoid expropriation. However, infor-
mality is detrimental for economic development, as it may be related with criminal
(unproductive) activities, and lead to insecure property rights, uncertainty in markets,
and low public goods provision, among other consequences.
Informality may have had a different effect on economic growth in different time
periods. The literature notes that informal miners gave gold mining the character
of an egalitarian and popular activity in Antioquia during the colonial period. This
significantly pushed the independence movement, in particular due to former slaves’
support (Poveda, 1981). A higher economic power of a broader share of the population
in the informal economy had effects on the way institutions performed. Not only
individuals were informal, but formal institutions deviated from their legal command.
Institutions performing outside the law might have allowed economic growth given
a law that was defined for the interests of a colonial extractive state, but neglecting
the law as a persistent feature of de facto institutions is now detrimental for economic
growth and welfare.
Incentives to become informal considered in this paper may be also relevant for
other events in history or in the present involving extractive states. Modern states
may come close to be extractive if public goods are clearly lower than taxes, thereby
making informality an attractive option. Hence, state failures causing this gap, such
as corruption, may have larger and more persistent detrimental effects than expected.
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Table 1.1: Antioquia. Share of molten gold by miners and traders by decades, 1670
-1800.
Decade Miners share Traders share
in molten gold in molten gold
1670 46,9% 53,1%
1680 24,0% 76,0%
1690 27,4% 72,6%
1700 10,9% 89,1%
1710 40,3% 59,7%
1720 19,4% 80,6%
1730 20,6% 79,4%
1740 14,5% 85,5%
1750 31,6% 68,4%
1760 3,0% 97,0%
1770 0,4% 99,6%
1780 5,7% 94,3%
1790 4,2% 95,8%
1800 10,2% 89,8%
Source: Twinam (1985), Table 3, p.70.
37
Extractive States and the Persistent Incentives for Being Lawless
Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics
colonial colonial
placer mines = 0 placer mines > 0 Total sample
N mean sd N mean sd N mean sd
no health or pension system 86 0.6794 0.0105 39 0.6812 0.0147 125 0.6800 0.0119
formal employment contract 26 0.231 0.181 15 0.303 0.193 41 0.257 0.186
child labor 26 0.160 0.120 15 0.106 0.081 41 0.140 0.109
placer mines (1739-1810)*** 86 0 0 39 3.3590 2.9063 125 1.0480 2.2428
total mines (1739-1810)*** 86 0.4302 1.5072 39 10.6667 9.1085 125 3.6240 7.0467
placer mines(1811-1900)*** 86 13.2558 50.7713 39 54.8205 71.9301 125 26.2240 61.0441
total mines (1811-1900)*** 86 41.1744 133.4357 39 133.3590 130.4043 125 69.9360 138.7633
Socioeconomic control variables
presence of natives in first half of 16th
century
86 0.5233 0.5024 39 0.5128 0.5064 125 0.5200 0.5016
population size 86 26901.1 49869.2 39 84308.0 352300.8 125 44812.1 201130.2
share of urban population 86 0.4602 0.1945 39 0.4203 0.2007 125 0.4477 0.1965
population density 85 248.7 1180.0 39 409.6 1190.0 124 299.3 1180.7
share of immigrants 86 0.3297 0.1239 39 0.3258 0.1469 125 0.3285 0.1309
share of forced migration 86 0.0155 0.0287 39 0.0180 0.0224 125 0.0163 0.0268
share of ethnic population 86 0.1101 0.1487 39 0.0893 0.1329 125 0.1036 0.1437
literacy rate 86 0.7374 0.0677 39 0.7550 0.0789 125 0.7429 0.0715
share secondary/university educa-
tion
86 0.1949 0.0822 39 0.2232 0.1230 125 0.2037 0.0971
employment rate 86 0.9654 0.0223 39 0.9665 0.0155 125 0.9657 0.0204
mean unsatisfied basic needs index* 85 50.0492 18.6841 39 43.7966 17.1213 124 48.0826 18.3703
distance to department capital city*** 85 151.8353 104.7152 39 90.8718 62.1607 124 132.6613 97.4167
mean coca-farmed area 86 39.8962 131.7487 39 58.1561 202.1636 125 45.5933 156.5097
presence of guerrilla 86 0.6395 0.4830 39 0.6154 0.4929 125 0.6320 0.4842
presence of paramilitaries 86 0.4419 0.4995 39 0.4872 0.5064 125 0.4560 0.5001
Geographic control variables
presence of river 86 0.8256 0.3817 39 0.8974 0.3074 125 0.8480 0.3605
(log) altitude** 85 6.4482 1.8646 39 7.1924 0.7791 124 6.6823 1.6377
presence of gold** 85 0.3412 0.4769 39 0.5385 0.5050 124 0.4032 0.4925
presence of coal 85 0.0353 0.1856 39 0.0513 0.2235 124 0.0403 0.1975
presence of oil 85 0.0353 0.1856 39 0 0 124 0.0242 0.1543
State presence variables
colonial officials** 85 0.2471 1.2335 39 1.2051 3.4042 124 0.5484 2.1952
colonial state presence*** 85 0.2824 0.6289 39 0.9231 1.1559 124 0.4839 0.8787
foundation year*** 86 1895 74.0126 39 1824 54.5512 125 1872 75.9126
local state presence 84 0.0381 0.0276 39 0.0456 0.0523 123 0.0405 0.0372
Notes: Municipalities are divided into treatment and control group, according to the availability of placer mines in the colonial period 1739-1810. Difference in means between
treated and control municipalities is: ***statistically significant at the 1% level; **statistically significant at the 5% level; *statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Table 1.3: OLS estimates for the baseline model
no health or formal employment child labor
pension system contract
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
placer mines 0.0014 0.0013 0.0023** -0.0544** -0.0166 -0.0295* 0.0278*** 0.0199* 0.0152
(1739-1810) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0264) (0.0203) (0.0157) (0.0074) (0.0108) (0.0185)
total mines -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0008** 0.0189*** 0.0043 0.0094* -0.0090*** -0.0064** -0.0053
(1739-1810) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0065) (0.0057) (0.0051) (0.0020) (0.0028) (0.0061)
Control variables
Geographic No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Socioeconomic No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Unit of observation Municipality Household Household
Obs 123 123 123 19419 19419 19419 5739 5739 5739
R2 0.0116 0.0497 0.1836 0.0287 0.0634 0.1156 0.0107 0.0213 0.0450
Mean dependent 0.680 0.680 0.680 0.257 0.257 0.257 0.140 0.140 0.140
variable
In columns (1)-(3): Robust standard errors in parentheses. In columns (4)-(9): Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the municipality level. Geographic control variables: (log) altitude, presence of a river, as well as presence
of gold, coal, and oil (2002). Socioeconomic control variables: (2005) population size, share of urban population, share of immigrants from other municipalities, share of forced migration, share of the population that belongs to an ethnic
group, literacy rate, share of individuals with secondary/university education, employment rate; presence of indigenous population in the first half of the 16th century, distance to the department capital city, population density (2008),
mean unsatisfied basic needs index (1985-2002), mean coca-farmed area (2000-2008), high/low presence of guerrilla groups (1993-2010) and high/low presence of auc paramilitary goup (1993-2010). ***Statistically significant at the 1%
level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level. *Statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Table 1.4: OLS regressions controlling for mines after independence
no health or formal employment child labor
pension system contract
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
placer mines 0.0014 0.0014 0.0023** -0.0588*** -0.0387** -0.0576*** 0.0253** 0.0252* 0.0511***
(1739-1810) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0170) (0.0185) (0.0147) (0.0113) (0.0136) (0.0157)
total mines -0.0006* -0.0006* -0.0008** 0.0244*** 0.0151** 0.0208*** -0.0097*** -0.0093*** -0.0196***
(1739-1810) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0043) (0.0060) (0.0050) (0.0026) (0.0034) (0.0053)
placer mines -0.0001* -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0005 0.0004 -0.0008* -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0000
(1811-1900) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0004)
total mines 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0014*** -0.0013** -0.0002 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006***
(1811-1900) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Control variables
Geographic No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Socioeconomic No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Unit of observation Municipality Household Household
Obs 123 123 123 19419 19419 19419 5739 5739 5739
R2 0.0351 0.0696 0.2005 0.0525 0.0781 0.1170 0.0176 0.0261 0.0492
Mean dependent 0.680 0.680 0.680 0.257 0.257 0.257 0.140 0.140 0.140
variable
In columns (1)-(3): Robust standard errors in parentheses. In columns (4)-(9): Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the municipality level. Geographic control variables: (log) altitude, presence of a river, as well as presence
of gold, coal, and oil (2002). Socioeconomic control variables: (2005) population size, share of urban population, share of immigrants from other municipalities, share of forced migration, share of the population that belongs to an ethnic
group, literacy rate, share of individuals with secondary/university education, employment rate; presence of indigenous population in the first half of the 16th century, distance to the department capital city, population density (2008),
mean unsatisfied basic needs index (1985-2002), mean coca-farmed area (2000-2008), high/low presence of guerrilla groups (1993-2010) and high/low presence of auc paramilitary goup (1993-2010). ***Statistically significant at the 1% level.
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. *Statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Table 1.5: OLS regressions among municipalities with presence of colonial gold mining
no health or formal employment child labor
pension system contract
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
placer mines 0.0014 0.0016 0.0014 -0.0554*** 0.0173 -0.0167** 0.0272** -0.0225 0.1295***
(1739-1810) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0156) (0.0210) (0.0070) (0.0104) (0.0151) (0.0050)
total mines -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0003 0.0209*** -0.0072 0.0077** -0.0105*** 0.0084 -0.0437***
(1739-1810) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0042) (0.0078) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0055) (0.0034)
placer mines -0.0001 -0.0002** -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0007 0.0034*** -0.0003 0.0002 0.0155***
(1811-1900) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0016) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0006)
total mines 0.0000 0.0001* 0.0000 -0.0016* 0.0006 -0.0026*** 0.0004 -0.0009* -0.0080***
(1811-1900) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Control variables
Geographic No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Socioeconomic No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Unit of observation Municipality Household Household
Obs 52 52 52 16985 16985 16985 4827 4827 4827
R2 0.0598 0.1375 0.4102 0.0485 0.0653 0.0871 0.0222 0.0364 0.0521
Mean dependent 0.680 0.680 0.680 0.257 0.257 0.257 0.140 0.140 0.140
variable
In columns (1)-(3): Robust standard errors in parentheses. In columns (4)-(9): Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the municipality level. Geographic control variables: (log) altitude, presence of a river, as well as presence
of gold, coal, and oil (2002). Socioeconomic control variables: (2005) population size, share of urban population, share of immigrants from other municipalities, share of forced migration, share of the population that belongs to an ethnic
group, literacy rate, share of individuals with secondary/university education, employment rate; presence of indigenous population in the first half of the 16th century, distance to the department capital city, population density (2008),
mean unsatisfied basic needs index (1985-2002), mean coca-farmed area (2000-2008), high/low presence of guerrilla groups (1993-2010) and high/low presence of auc paramilitary goup (1993-2010). ***Statistically significant at the 1% level.
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. *Statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Table 1.6: OLS regressions among municipalities with no gold today and using the share of placer mines
no health or formal employment child labor
pension system contract
With no With no With no
gold today gold today gold today
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
placer mines 0.0018 -0.1208** 0.0428**
(1739-1810) (0.0013) (0.0495) (0.0175)
share of placer mines 0.0064 -0.0367 -0.0294
(1739-1810) (0.0064) (0.1303) (0.0783)
total mines -0.0006** -0.0002* 0.0419** 0.0048** -0.0055 -0.0022
(1739-1810) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0185) (0.0020) (0.0055) (0.0013)
placer mines 0.0001 -0.0001* 0.0003 0.0006 -0.0093*** -0.0004
(1811-1900) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0077) (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0008)
total mines -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0034 -0.0013** 0.0029*** 0.0004
(1811-1900) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0023) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0003)
Unit of observation Municipality Household Household
Obs 73 123 16918 19419 4743 5739
R2 0.0657 0.0690 0.0321 0.0755 0.0224 0.0232
Mean dependent 0.680 0.680 0.257 0.257 0.140 0.140
variable
In columns (1)-(2): Robust standard errors in parentheses. In columns (3)-(6): Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the municipality level. All regressions controlling
for geographic control variables: (log) altitude, presence of a river, as well as presence of gold (in columns 2, 4 and 6), coal, and oil (2002). .***Statistically significant at the 1% level.
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. *Statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Table 1.7: OLS regressions for historical state presence outcomes
colonial colonial foundation
officials state presence year
(1) (2) (3)
placer mines -0.5816 -0.1984* 13.0491
(1739-1810) (0.4388) (0.1120) (10.2960)
total mines 0.2877 0.1250*** -7.8074**
(1739-1810) (0.1753) (0.0373) (3.4324)
Obs 123 123 123
R2 0.2024 0.3501 0.2677
Mean dependent 0.5484 0.4839 1872
variable
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Units of observation are municipalities. All specifications control-
ling for presence of indigenous population in the first half of the 16th century and (log) altitude. ***Statis-
tically significant at the 1% level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level. *Statistically significant at the
10% level.
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Table 1.8: OLS regressions - with historical measures of state presence as explanatory variables
no health or formal employment child labor
pension system contract
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
colonial 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0087 0.0058 -0.0071 -0.0012 -0.0199
officials (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0074) (0.0070) (0.0160) (0.0050) (0.0041) (0.0182)
colonial -0.0011 -0.0009 0.0004 0.0300 0.0234 -0.0114 0.0059 0.0181 0.0622
state presence (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0361) (0.0284) (0.0331) (0.0248) (0.0221) (0.0400)
foundation 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0006** -0.0006** -0.0008**
year (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
placer mines 0.0012 0.0024** -0.0660** -0.0680*** 0.0560*** 0.0659***
(1739-1810) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0267) (0.0200) (0.0178) (0.0217)
total mines -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0009** 0.0024 0.0255** 0.0242*** -0.0022 -0.0216*** -0.0262***
(1739-1810) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0020) (0.0100) (0.0070) (0.0019) (0.0062) (0.0079)
Control variables
Geographic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Socioeconomic No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Unit of observation Municipality Household Household
Obs 123 123 123 19419 19419 19419 5739 5739 5739
R2 0.0655 0.0722 0.2036 0.0767 0.0796 0.1173 0.0272 0.0320 0.0514
Mean dependent 0.680 0.680 0.680 0.257 0.257 0.257 0.140 0.140 0.140
variable
In columns (1)-(3): Robust standard errors in parentheses. In columns (4)-(9): Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the municipality level. All regressions also controlling for mines after independence. Geographic control
variables: (log) altitude, presence of a river, as well as presence of gold, coal, and oil (2002). Socioeconomic control variables: (2005) population size, share of urban population, share of immigrants from other municipalities, share of
forced migration, share of the population that belongs to an ethnic group, literacy rate, share of individuals with secondary/university education, employment rate; presence of indigenous population in the first half of the 16th century,
distance to the department capital city, population density (2008), mean unsatisfied basic needs index (1985-2002), mean coca-farmed area (2000-2008), high/low presence of guerrilla groups (1993-2010) and high/low presence of auc
paramilitary goup (1993-2010). ***Statistically significant at the 1% level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level. *Statistically significant at the 10% level.
4
4
Extractive
States
and
the
PersistentIncentives
for
Being
Law
less
Table 1.9: IV/OLS regressions - instrumenting local state presence in 1995.
no health or formal employment child labor
pension system contract
First stage IV OLS First stage IV OLS First stage IV OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
local state -0.0962 -0.0624** 0.0716 0.3617 1.6997 -0.3241
presence 1995 (0.2064) (0.0265) (1.2519) (0.8422) (1.4294) (0.5569)
placer mines 0.0008 0.0013 0.0014 0.0196** -0.0392* -0.0411** 0.0138* 0.0234 0.0255*
(1739-1810) (0.0042) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0077) (0.0208) (0.0176) (0.0074) (0.0174) (0.0135)
total mines 0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0005* -0.0069** 0.0152** 0.0156*** -0.0050* -0.0096** -0.0093**
(1739-1810) (0.0017) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0027) (0.0064) (0.0058) (0.0026) (0.0045) (0.0035)
foundation 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
year (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
colonial 0.0009 -0.0001 -0.0003
officials (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0010)
colonial 0.0042 0.0195*** 0.0170**
state presence (0.0080) (0.0074) (0.0080)
F stat for 0.29 3.48 2.28
instruments
p-value for CLR 0.886 0.752 0.024
Unit of observation Municipality Household Household
Obs 123 123 123 19419 19419 19419 5739 5739 5739
R2 0.1471 0.0929 0.1026 0.5599 0.0782 0.0783 0.5550 0.0137 0.0264
Mean dependent 0.040 0.680 0.680 0.040 0.257 0.257 0.040 0.140 0.140
variable
In columns (1)-(3): Robust standard errors in parentheses. In columns (4)-(9): Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the municipality level. All regressions controlling for mines after independence and geographic control variables: (log)
altitude, presence of a river, as well as presence of gold, coal, and oil (2002).***Statistically significant at the 1% level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level. *Statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Table 1.10: Descriptive statistics for municipalities with colonial gold mining
colonial colonial
placer mines = 0 placer mines > 0 Total sample
N mean sd N mean sd N mean sd
no health or pension system 13 0.6745 0.0072 39 0.6812 0.0147 52 0.6795 0.0134
formal employment contract 5 0.3476 0.2381 15 0.3032 0.1926 20 0.3143 0.1992
child labor 5 0.1616 0.0939 15 0.1056 0.0806 20 0.1196 0.0852
placer mines (1739-1810)*** 13 0.0000 0.0000 39 3.3590 2.9063 52 2.5192 2.9070
total mines (1739-1810)*** 13 2.8462 2.9396 39 10.6667 9.1085 52 8.7115 8.6915
placer mines(1811-1900) 13 40.6154 84.5069 39 54.8205 71.9301 52 51.2692 74.6593
total mines (1811-1900) 13 117.5385 186.4759 39 133.3590 130.4043 52 129.4038 144.5697
Socioeconomic control variables
presence of natives in first half of 16th
century
13 0.6154 0.5064 39 0.5128 0.5064 52 0.5385 0.5034
population size 13 37696 62018.6 39 84308 352300.8 52 72655 306266.0
share of urban population 13 0.4917 0.2209 39 0.4203 0.2007 52 0.4381 0.2061
population density 13 907.1392 2874.5220 39 409.5944 1189.9830 52 533.9806 1745.4620
share of immigrants 13 0.3415 0.1578 39 0.3258 0.1469 52 0.3297 0.1482
share of forced migration* 13 0.0068 0.0041 39 0.0180 0.0224 52 0.0152 0.0200
share of ethnic population 13 0.0597 0.0617 39 0.0893 0.1329 52 0.0819 0.1193
literacy rate 13 0.7791 0.0723 39 0.7550 0.0789 52 0.7610 0.0774
share secondary/university educa-
tion
13 0.2269 0.1168 39 0.2232 0.1230 52 0.2241 0.1203
employment rate 13 0.9698 0.0115 39 0.9665 0.0155 52 0.9674 0.0145
mean unsatisfied basic needs index 13 39.1938 17.0746 39 43.7966 17.1213 52 42.6459 17.0607
distance to department capital city 13 76.9231 52.9944 39 90.8718 62.1607 52 87.3846 59.8082
mean coca-farmed area 13 12.8652 46.2194 39 58.1561 202.1636 52 46.8333 177.0510
presence of guerrilla 13 0.5385 0.5189 39 0.6154 0.4929 52 0.5962 0.4955
presence of paramilitaries 13 0.4615 0.5189 39 0.4872 0.5064 52 0.4808 0.5045
Geographic control variables
presence of river 13 0.9231 0.2774 39 0.8974 0.3074 52 0.9038 0.2977
(log) altitude 13 7.3696 0.3858 39 7.1924 0.7791 52 7.2367 0.7024
presence of gold 13 0.3077 0.4804 39 0.5385 0.5050 52 0.4808 0.5045
presence of coal 13 0 0 39 0.0513 0.2235 52 0.0385 0.1942
presence of oil 13 0 0 39 0 0 52 0 0
State presence variables
colonial officials 13 0.8462 2.7642 39 1.2051 3.4042 52 1.1154 3.2337
colonial state presence 13 0.5385 0.8771 39 0.9231 1.1559 52 0.8269 1.0976
foundation year 13 1807 88.1399 39 1824 54.5512 52 1819 64.0180
local state presence 13 0.0527 0.0267 39 0.0456 0.0523 52 0.0474 0.0471
Notes: Municipalities are divided into treatment and control group, according to the availability of placer mines in the colonial period 1739-1810. Difference in means between
treated and control municipalities is: ***Statistically significant at the 1% level; *statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Table 1.11: IV/OLS regressions - instrumenting tax revenue per capita.
no health or formal employment child labor
pension system contract
First stage IV OLS First stage IV OLS First stage IV OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
tax revenue -0.0278 -0.0645*** -0.1641 0.9889*** 1.3992 -0.3870
per capita (0.0343) (0.0171) (0.9443) (0.3634) (0.9217) (0.3218)
placer mines 0.0088 0.0014 0.0014 0.0055 -0.0413* -0.0234 0.0028 0.0575** 0.0162
(1739-1810) (0.0067) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0167) (0.0229) (0.0200) (0.0153) (0.0266) (0.0181)
total mines -0.0033 -0.0005* -0.0005* -0.0022 0.0162* 0.0082 -0.0010 -0.0221** -0.0058
(1739-1810) (0.0021) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0059) (0.0083) (0.0061) (0.0053) (0.0093) (0.0055)
foundation -0.0002 -0.0003* -0.0001
year (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
colonial 0.0037 -0.0014 0.0011
officials (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0025)
colonial 0.0118 0.0269** 0.0204
state presence (0.0105) (0.0126) (0.0126)
F stat. for 3.23 2.46 2.14
instruments
p-value for CLR 0.581 0.207 0.006
Unit of observation Municipality Household Household
Obs 123 123 123 19419 19419 19419 5739 5739 5739
R2 0.2740 0.1098 0.1292 0.8310 0.0762 0.0836 0.8545 . 0.0277
Mean dependent 0.051 0.680 0.680 0.051 0.257 0.257 0.051 0.140 0.140
variable
In columns (1)-(3): Robust standard errors in parentheses. In columns (4)-(9): Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the municipality level. All regressions controlling for mines after independence and geographic control variables: (log)
altitude, presence of a river, as well as presence of gold, coal, and oil (2002).***Statistically significant at the 1% level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level. *Statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Table 1.12: IV/OLS regressions - instrumenting share of taxes in total municipal revenue.
no health or formal employment child labor
pension system contract
First stage IV OLS First stage IV OLS First stage IV OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
share of -0.0128 -0.0275*** 0.2653 0.7401*** 0.2766 -0.2301
tax revenue (0.0151) (0.0057) (0.4256) (0.1166) (0.5365) (0.1373)
placer mines 0.0170 0.0014 0.0014 -0.0220 -0.0289 -0.0113 -0.0196 0.0377 0.0148
(1739-1810) (0.0148) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0233) (0.0226) (0.0191) (0.0245) (0.0262) (0.0157)
total mines -0.0070 -0.0005* -0.0005 0.0072 0.0112 0.0043 0.0064 -0.0140 -0.0055
(1739-1810) (0.0046) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0091) (0.0077) (0.0054) (0.0090) (0.0091) (0.0046)
foundation -0.0004** -0.0002 0.0001
year (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004)
colonial 0.0037 -0.0076 -0.0025
officials (0.0078) (0.0064) (0.0064)
colonial 0.0351 0.0660** 0.0545*
state presence (0.0269) (0.0298) (0.0297)
F stat for 3.90 1.66 1.66
instruments
p-value for CLR 0.525 0.373 0.119
Unit of observation Municipality Household Household
Obs 123 123 123 19419 19419 19419 5739 5739 5739
R2 0.2050 0.1232 0.1447 0.7452 0.0880 0.0948 0.7566 0.0127 0.0296
Mean dependent 0.153 0.680 0.680 0.153 0.257 0.257 0.153 0.140 0.140
variable
In columns (1)-(3): Robust standard errors in parentheses. In columns (4)-(9): Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the municipality level. All regressions controlling for mines after independence and geographic control variables: (log)
altitude, presence of a river, as well as presence of gold, coal, and oil (2002).***Statistically significant at the 1% level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level. *Statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Chapter 2
Political Inequality and the Origins
of Distrust: Evidence for Colombia
2.1 Introduction
Institutions and social capital are considered in the literature as causes of differ-
ences in economic development across countries. They are highly persistent over time,
but the channels through which they persist and affect economic development are still
an ongoing field of research. The aim of this paper is to identify the impact of po-
litical inequality on social capital in Colombia. With political inequality (or political
exclusion) I refer to the extent to which political institutions do not allow groups to
access political power equally. I hypothesize that political exclusion in Colombia has
damaged generalized trust and induced free-riding behaviors. This would mean that
political inequality has not only affected economic development in the usual ways
claimed in the literature, for example, through the establishment of economic institu-
tions that favor the elites, but also that political inequality may have affected economic
development through the damage of social capital. The latter supports the idea that
formal institutions have a broader effect on society that is also important for economic
development and for their own persistence.
The way I test this hypothesis is by using an important event for the Colombian
political system in the 1950s: The National Front agreement. The National Front in-
stitutionalized the dominance of the two traditional parties, Liberal and Conservative.
According to it, these parties had to alternate the presidency every four years during
the period 1958-1974, while maintaining half share of all executive branch offices, as
well as legislative, judicial and bureaucratic positions in each presidential period. The
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National Front not only imposed a formal barrier to political participation, but it no-
tably increased clientelism as suggested by qualitative evidence. The literature also
claims that there was an increasing distrust in government, elections and democracy
after the National Front.
Political inequality, as a result of the National Front, did not affect regions in
Colombia equally. Municipalities and departments with a stronger preference for par-
ties other than the Liberal and Conservative should have experienced a higher political
exclusion than those that only had a traditional political affiliation. I thus investigate
the relationship between the intensity of the National Front treatment, as measured
by the mean electoral share of non-traditional parties before the National Front, and
various measures of social capital.
I first use survey measures from the Social Capital Barometer for Colombia –
Barcas- in 2011. Since variation in the political exclusion treatment might be related
with social capital in the past or with other factors that determine social capital today,
I deal with this potential endogeneity in the empirical strategy. After controlling for
relevant observables at the individual and municipality level, and unobservables at
the region level, I find that a larger political exclusion treatment (electoral share of
non-traditional parties at the municipality level before the National Front) is associ-
ated with less trusting individuals today and with a higher perception of free riding
behaviors. Using the same measure of the treatment today and present electoral share
of communist parties as placebos yields no significant effects on social capital, while
the treatment is equally significant, also similar in magnitude, when including both
the treatment and any of the placebos. However, I further try to control for past social
capital by using mean electoral turnout before the National Front as a proxy. After con-
trolling for past social capital with this proxy, a higher treatment is still significantly
related to lower social capital outcomes. Results are robust when considering vari-
ation within blocks of municipalities comparable before the treatment (as suggested
by a propensity score calculation), and when performing regressions weighted by the
share of non-immigrants in each municipality.
Second, I find additional evidence of a deterioration of social capital in terms of
electoral turnout, which I use at the department level in a panel fixed effects model.
After controlling for department fixed effects and time fixed effects, departments af-
fected by a higher political exclusion have, on average, a lower electoral turnout for
the period after the National Front. Pre-trends are not observed, as this negative asso-
ciation is only significant for years after the treatment.
The intuition behind the hypothesis in this study is that political exclusion creates
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distrust towards the state, which then harms social capital. To the extent that absten-
tionism reflects distrust towards the state, results for electoral turnout above support
this channel: Departments facing a larger political exclusion due to the National Front
would be the ones with lower levels of trust towards the state after the treatment. I
further investigate the proposed channel using survey measures of state perception
today. I find that a higher National Front treatment is associated with a higher percep-
tion of corruption in the state, and this, in turn, is associated with lower trust levels
and a higher perception of free-riding behaviors.
Although these results may be evidence in favor of distrust towards the state as
a channel, there might be additional channels through which the treatment is also
operating. This is clear in that the National Front treatment still matters for social
capital after controlling for the suggested channel. Presence of violence may seem a
likely way through which political exclusion damaged social capital, since political
exclusion produced violence against the state with the emergence of guerrilla groups
during the NF period. However, results cannot support presence of violence as a
channel.
Extensive literature has claimed institutions as the major cause of differences in
development outcomes, not only explaining the unprecedented economic growth af-
ter 1800,1 but also the present underdevelopment of many countries.2 The question
is still how institutions are determined. In this sense, the literature has given a fun-
damental role to political power. It is argued that the evolution of political power
reinforces particular initial conditions and its distribution determines economic insti-
tutions (Acemoglu et al., 2005b).
Empirical literature on Colombian development identifies political inequality as a
major cause of underdevelopment. Acemoglu et al. (2007) find for the Colombian
region of Cundinamarca that political rather than economic inequality in the 19th
century is significantly related with underdevelopment paths among municipalities.
Accordingly, historical and theoretical literature also claims that political inequality is
central to explain Colombia’s economic development. Robinson (2005) suggests, for
instance, that the incoherence of Colombia’s poor development outcomes with its long
history of economic stability and excellent macroeconomic policy can be explained by
the persistence of political elites and traditional parties.
1North and Thomas (1970); North and Weingast (1989); Acemoglu et al. (2005a); La Porta et al. (2008);
Acemoglu et al. (2011).
2Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2002); Acemoglu et al. (2001); Acemoglu et al. (2002); Banerjee and
Iyer (2005); Nunn, (2008); Feyrer and Sacerdote (2009); Dell (2010).
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On the other hand, extensive literature would claim an important role for social
capital in the Colombian context. In general, social capital is considered to have a
direct impact on economic development since it establishes the degree of cooperation
and mutual trust among individuals, which are key elements for the development of
markets, for solving collective problems, and thus for public goods provision. Several
studies3 have then reported a positive and significant relationship between social cap-
ital and development outcomes across and within countries (arguably causal). Social
capital may also matter indirectly by influencing formal institutions and their perfor-
mance. Accordingly, the literature has shown a significant association between social
capital and institutional outcomes.4
Literature on social capital often casts doubts on the dominance of formal insti-
tutions in determining economic growth and claims that culture has been severely
understated. The main fact it brings into question is that same formal institutions can
perform differently in different cultural environments, where also different economic
outcomes are observed (Tabellini, 2010), although this relationship does not necessarily
mean a causal effect of culture on institutions performance or economic development.
Additionally, this literature points out the need to understand the way cultural values
are formed and transmitted over time. Hence, several studies have searched for the
historical origins of social capital differences;5 to the best of my knowledge, this has
not been studied in Colombia.
This paper provides the following intuition: Political inequality creates in the first
place distrust towards the state; citizens may not agree with, nor trust the use and
destination of public resources and they may not believe, in general, that governmen-
tal policies will be socially optimal. If everyone has to fend for oneself because the
state is not trustworthy to represent the society’s interests, a greater sense of individ-
ualism or selfishness is likely induced, and this becomes common knowledge so that
everybody is in a non-cooperative equilibrium. This intuition implies that the inter-
play between citizens and state under political inequality probably causes a broader
effect that spreads out free riding and distrust to culture as a whole.6 Like the papers
3Putnam et al. (1993); Helliwell and Putnam (1995); Fukuyama (1996); Knack and Keefer (1997); Guiso
et al. (2004); Algan and Cahuc (2007).
4Putnam et al. (1993); Fukuyama (1996); La Porta et al. (1997); Knack (2002); Uslaner (2006).
5Putnam (1993); Guiso et al. (2008); Tabellini, (2010); Nunn and Wantchekon (2011); Durante (2010);
Jacob and Tyrell (2010).
6When I argue that political inequality affects social capital, I do not refer to attitudes that appear as
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by Jacob and Tyrell (2010) and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), this paper shows a case
of social capital erosion.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section I give a brief historical back-
ground of the Colombian National Front. Section 2.3 describes the data. Section 2.4
presents the empirical strategy. In section 2.5 I report results and robustness checks.
Section 2.6 investigates the proposed channel in the hypothesis. Finally, section 2.7
concludes.
2.2 The Colombian National Front
The economic development of Colombia seems to be contradictory, as highlighted
by Robinson (2005). He notes that Colombia, while being a country with a history of
good macroeconomic policy, has very disappointing socio-economic outcomes, just as
those of any other Latin American country.
Unlike the rest of countries in Latin America, Colombia’s economic performance
during the 20th century has shown a very low volatility. A prudent macroeconomic
policy has avoided inflation problems and debt crisis, whereas they have been a major
source of instability for countries in the region. Colombia has been also unique in
the continuity of its political elites and traditional parties since their foundation in the
1840s (Robinson, 2005).
One reason for a prudent macroeconomic policy might be that persistent elites that
receive a high share of national income and seek to maximize the value of their rents
are willing to carry out appropriate macroeconomic policies. The question posed by
Robinson (2005) is: how can this persistence of elites be explained without satisfying
social improvements and without recurring to populism? And the answer comes from
large literature that points out clientelism as an outstanding feature of Colombian
politics.7 Robinson (2005), in particular, argues that “Colombian elites have long-
developed social networks and specific investments in delivering patronage” (Robin-
son, 2005, p. 11) and as a consequence, clientelism has become increasingly efficient
as a means of maintaining control of the political system (Robinson, 2005).
One chapter in the continuity of political elites in Colombia is given by the National
a direct outcome of institutions-driven incentives; for example, that there are less entrepreneurs because
property rights are not well protected, or that people cheat on taxes because law enforcement is weak. I
refer to an effect on everyday behaviors.
7Duarte (2003), Martz (1997), Carey and Shugart (1995), Leal and Davila (1990), Diaz (1986), Losada
(1984), Schmidt (1977).
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Front agreement –El Frente Nacional (hereafter NF). This agreement institutionalized
the exclusive dominance of the two traditional parties, Liberals and Conservatives, for
the period 1958-1974. Liberals and Conservatives had to alternate the presidency every
four years during that period, while maintaining half share of all executive branch
offices, as well as legislative, judicial and bureaucratic positions in each presidential
period.8 The NF was a key element for policy makers to achieve a long run perspective
in economic policy (Hartlyn, 1988; Cárdenas, 2009), but also for the rise of clientelism
according to qualitative historical evidence.
2.2.1 Emergence and consequences of the National Front
The NF emerged as a way to stop violence at that time and as an urgent measure
conceived by the political elites, who feared to be excluded from power during the
military government of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla. Before the NF, Liberals and
Conservatives had always fought against each other for holding control over the state
and public offices. Precisely during the decade before (period called La Violencia),
Colombia experienced great violence as a result of an increased political polarization
between these parties; this started with the presidential elections in 1946. Although
Liberals were a majority at that moment, a fracture within this party allowed a mi-
nority of Conservatives to win the presidency, and this was the trigger for a civil war
(Hartlyn, 1984). Violence became even worse after the assassination in 1948 of the
Liberal populist leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitán, who was a main figure in the political
context. This period of chaos was ruled by two conservative governments until the
overthrow by General Rojas Pinilla in 1953.9
Although Rojas Pinilla (1953-1957) came to power with support of sectors from
both parties, his government distanced these political actors, wide sectors of the pop-
ulation and main economic players. Corruption, violence and populist policies, on the
one hand, and Rojas Pinilla’s desire to stay in power, on the other, were the causes
of an increased opposition that derived in the NF agreement. Rojas’ attempts to stop
the elites’ NF led to a generalized strike promoted by bankers, industrialists and mer-
8Power parity between the two traditional parties remained even beyond the period of the NF thanks
to a constitutional reform made in 1968. According to it, Conservatives and Liberals should share ad-
ministrative posts until 1978, although free electoral competition for presidency would return in 1974;
moreover, after 1978, the winning party should cede some power to the second one, which was the case
until 1986 (Pizarro, 2004).
9This event was the result of the intensified violence under the government period 1950-1953 and the
conspiracy of Conservative leaders with the military (Hartlyn, 1984).
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chants, which made Rojas finally withdraw in 1957 (Hartlyn, 1984). The NF was signed
in 1957 and the first presidency started in 1958 with a Liberal candidate.
The NF indeed eliminated conflicts among the two traditional parties and encour-
aged cooperation between them, while they were becoming more similar over time
(Melo, 1978; Acevedo and Castao, 2002). The NF implied institutional stability, but
political leaders did not take advantage of it in order to gain real democratic support.
For instance, although some social reforms were proposed during that period, they
were not fully executed or not even undertaken and were just credible as attempts
to legitimizing an exclusive and unfair political system (Melo, 1978; Acevedo and
Castaño, 2002). Accordingly, Hartlyn (1984; 1988) points out the marginalization of
the common people from policymaking: “[The National Front] promoted the defense
of organized minority rights over majority rights, thwarted reform, and produced
governments with strong immobilist tendencies” (Hartlyn, 1984, p. 247).
One important effect attributed to the NF was increased clientelism. As the NF
promoted intraparty competition, not competition across parties, the NF produced
fragmentation within parties (Pizarro, 2004). Members of a same party had to compete
for the presidency, as well as for the share of bureaucratic quotas. This fragmentation
was likely to increase clientelism due to the increasing need of support outside the own
party (Pizarro, 2004), and due to the obstacles to governance faced by the executive.10
On the other hand, following the hypothesis of Robinson (2005), it can be argued that
the NF gave the traditional parties the time and space to build the necessary networks
in order to keep power easily through clientelism.
One salient fact during the NF was the emergence of illegal armed groups, some of
which persist until these days. Hence, while the NF eliminated violence between tra-
ditional parties, it induced another form of violence as a response to political exclusion
(Acevedo and Castaño, 2002; Pizarro, 2004).
While the emergence of these armed groups is important evidence that the NF
represented a political shock, the latter probably had other less visible, but no less
relevant, effects. The literature clearly identifies an increasing distrust in elections and
democracy and thus a rise in abstentionism during the period of the NF (Acevedo-
Castaño, 2002). There was a feeling that electoral results were predetermined (Tirado,
1989); on the other hand, as Liberals and Conservatives were turning more ideologi-
cally equal, they could not offer distinguishable options to the citizens (Melo, 1978).
10The NF agreement also established a mandatory two-thirds majority vote in the Congress until 1968
(Hartlyn, 1984).
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As Melo (1978) points out, rising abstentionism was even resistant to processes like the
growth of urban population, the increase in the literacy and numeracy rate, as well
as the improvement of media. It is then argued that the linkages between parties and
citizens turned more dependent on the provision of private benefits (Melo, 1978).
2.2.2 Variation in the magnitude of the National Front impact
The NF agreement imposed a formal barrier to political participation and may have
increased clientelism as a consequence of intraparty competition, political exclusion,
and the absence of an opposition control, which made clientelistic networks easier to
build. Although this agreement was valid in the whole country, the magnitude of
its impact was not likely equal across regions. Some regions were more politically
diverse than others before the NF, or in other words, some regions had a stronger
preference for parties other than the Liberal and Conservative and, as a consequence,
these regions experienced a higher political exclusion.
Non-traditional parties in the first half of the twentieth century were already facing
high entry barriers to the political system, and therefore many of these third parties
did not have continuity in the political scene. The only exception was the Communist
party (Pizarro, 1997); it was founded in 1930 and its main support came from previous
farmers and laborers’ political movements grouped into the former Socialist party
(Medina, 1989).
Figure 2.1 shows a map of Colombia locating the 57 municipalities in the main sur-
vey sample used in the empirical analysis below; it displays differences in their mean
electoral share of non-traditional parties before the NF.11 As can be seen, preference
for non-traditional parties in the sample is fairly well spread across departments. Fig-
ure 2.2, in turn, shows mean electoral share of non-traditional parties before the NF
at the department level. Now some regions (areas including more than one depart-
ment)12 look more homogeneous than others; for instance, the Pacific-north region
with a high mean electoral share of non-traditional parties, and the south-west re-
gion, which exhibits in contrast a very low share. Also homogeneous is the ‘Viejo
Caldas’-Antioquia region, whereas the Atlantic coast, the central region of the country
and the ‘Santanderes’ (Santander and Norte de Santander departments) display more
11Figure 2.4 (in the Appendix) indicates municipalities with a mean electoral share of non-traditional
parties before the NF higher than 1% in order to ease the observation of ‘treated’ municipalities according
to this threshold.
12These regions are bordered with a thicker line in the figures.
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heterogeneity.
The variation observed in these figures is used in this paper in order to measure the
effect of political exclusion on social capital in a within-country setting. The conditions
for identification of such effect will be discussed in the empirical strategy.
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Figure 2.1: Mean electoral share of non-
traditional parties 1941-1951 across municipali-
ties in the sample.
³
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1.2 - 3.6%
3.6 - 7.2%
7.2 - 12.4%
12.4 - 19.1%
Notes: Circle size is proportional to (log) municipality population. Regions bordered
with a thicker line are used for defining region fixed effects in the empirical strategy.
Figure 2.2: Mean electoral share of non-
traditional parties 1943-1951 across depart-
ments
³
0 100 200 300 400 50050
Kilometers
Legend
0 - 0.2%
0.2 - 0.7%
0.7 - 1.2%
1.2 - 2.0%
2.0 - 4.9%
4.9 - 13.5%
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Notes: Mean electoral share of non-traditional parties before the NF was not available
for San Andrés -archipelago not shown in the map-, Amazonas, Caquetá, Vaupés,
Guainı́a and Vichada, as indicated in the map. Although it was not available for the
Arauca, Casanare and Guaviare departments, either, this measure in their respective
capital city is shown in order to cover all departments in the sample. These three
departments are not included in Figure 2.3, nor in panel regressions presented in Table
2.3.
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2.3 Data description
2.3.1 Social capital and state perception data
I use the Colombian social capital survey –Barcas- for the year 2011 in order to
obtain measures of interest. Barcas is the source used by the World Values Survey and
has a representative sample of individuals from 57 Colombian municipalities, 26 of
which are departments’ capital cities.13 It surveys a total of 3028 individuals.
Social capital outcomes are based on the following questions: 1) Generally speak-
ing would you say most people can be trusted, or one cannot be that trusting when
dealing with people?; 2) Do you think most people would try to take advantage of
you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair? With the first question I aim to
measure generalized trust; I then define the variable trust. With the second question
I measure perception of free riding behaviors, and based on it I define the variable
fair.14 trust and fair will be used as dependent variables in the empirical strategy.15
The Barcas survey also allows observing some individuals’ characteristics that I
would like to control for. I can observe if the individual considers himself as belonging
to an ethnic/racial group, namely, black or indigenous. I also identify if the individual
has been a victim of the armed conflict in Colombia, by considering positive answers
in any of the following three questions: Have you lost any member of your family or
close relative because of the armed conflict? Has any member of your family, or have
you had to take refuge or to leave your home because of the armed conflict? Has any
member of your family had to leave the country because of the armed conflict?
Some questions in the Barcas survey are related to distrust towards the state, which
is the suggested channel in this study. I construct a corruption variable based on the
reported corruption perception in public offices; I also construct the variable all equal,
which indicates the extent to which individuals believe that state’s decisions are not
applied equally to everybody.
13Given that a significant part of the regions’ population is concentrated in capital cities, total popula-
tion of the 57 municipalities in the sample would account for 46% of the country population.
14Although the Barcas survey also provides questions on the extent to which individuals accept free
riding behavior (or are free riders), these questions are subject to be dishonestly answered as these kinds
of behavior should not be socially acceptable. Yet, some literature based on experimental data has pointed
out that people’s statements about the behavior of others may reflect to some extent how they behave
themselves (Glaeser et al., 2000).
15Mean values of trust and fair in each municipality are shown in the Colombian map in Figure 2.5
and Figure 2.6, respectively.
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2.3.2 Electoral data
The Colombian national electoral office (Registradurı́a Nacional del Estado Civil) is
the source for electoral data. Variables of interest are electoral share of non-traditional
parties, defined as the share of votes for non-traditional parties in total votes for a
given elections, and electoral turnout, defined as total number of votes over electoral
potential (individuals able to vote).
Electoral reports were directly consulted for electoral share of non-traditional par-
ties and electoral turnout at the municipal level before 1958. Some (10) municipalities
in the Barcas survey did not exist before 1958 (were not recognized as municipalities
given their small size). However, the electoral share of non-traditional parties before
the NF could be established for them as being zero, since this share was either zero
for the whole department, or, if positive, this share was the outcome of votes in other
municipalities within the department, where these other municipalities also exist to-
day.
On the other hand, electoral share of non-traditional parties in recent decades (1994
onwards) is calculated with databases provided by Universidad de los Andes, and
electoral turnout at the department level was consulted at the Electoral Processes Ob-
servatory - Universidad del Rosario.
2.3.3 Socio-economic and geographical data for municipalities
I use two Colombian censuses in order to construct socio-economic variables at the
municipality level. One census is the one closest before the treatment in 1951;16 the
second census in 2005 is the one closest to social capital outcomes. An important prob-
lem faced with the 1951 Census is heterogeneity in the type of information available
for all municipalities. This restricts the number of covariates I can construct from it.
Additional variables are provided by the Center of Economic Development Studies
(CEDE) at Universidad de los Andes. Their original sources are the National Admin-
istrative Department of Statistics –DANE (for poverty and inequality indexes), the
Geographic Institute Agustin Codazzi –IGAC (for geographic data) and the Colom-
bian Presidency Observatory of Human Rights (for presence of illegal armed groups
and violence).
16For municipalities in the Barcas survey that did not exist in 1951, I have to assume departments
averages for some variables and estimate their population in that year according to population growth
rates.
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2.3.4 Descriptive statistics
All variables presented above are defined in Table 2.24 in the Appendix and de-
scriptive statistics of them are shown in Table 2.1. Municipalities are divided into
treatment and control group in Table 2.1 using a binary treatment, which takes the
value of one if mean electoral share of non-traditional parties in 1941-1951 is higher
than one percent. The comparison of covariates by treatment status is further dis-
cussed in section 2.4.2 below.
[Table 2.1 here]
2.4 Empirical strategy
The empirical strategy pursues the identification of a causal effect of political ex-
clusion on social capital in Colombia. I have argued that the National Front –NF-
implied a major shock as it institutionalized political exclusion of non-traditional par-
ties; moreover, I claim there was variation in its impact, considering the extent to
which individuals identified with those parties, and were therefore excluded from the
political system.
The employed measure for political exclusion treatment is thus the mean electoral
share of non-traditional parties in each municipality before the NF, more precisely,
during the period 1941-195117 (political exclusion). The main issue of concern is, how-
ever, that the variation in the treatment may not be exogenous for social capital; elec-
toral share of non-traditional parties might be related with social capital in the past or
with some other factors that determine social capital today.
In the following subsections I will present the baseline model for cross-sectional
data (which uses social capital outcomes from the Barcas survey), the conditions for
identification of a causal effect, and finally, a panel approach using an alternative
measure of social capital.
17This period corresponds to 6 legislative elections before the NF. See Table 2.24 for a more precise
definition.
62
Political Inequality and the Origins of Distrust
2.4.1 Baseline model
The baseline model is given by equation (2.1), where social capital outcomes at the
individual level are a function of region fixed effects, treatment and control variables.
Social Capital Outcomeij = ηR + β political exclusionj + X′ijθ + Z
′
jγ + εij (2.1)
Index i denotes individuals in the sample, whereas index j refers to the correspond-
ing municipality for individual i. Social Capital Outcome is either the variable trust or
f air. ηR are region fixed effects. These Colombian regions are wider than departments
and can be clearly identified in that country, since cultural and economic character-
istics are similar within them, and also different from these characteristics in other
regions. Municipalities in the sample can be classified into six regions, which were
already mentioned in section 2.2.2.18 Department fixed effects would be preferable,
but for some departments I do not have more than one municipality in the sample
and hence they would capture the treatment. X is a vector of individual controls; Z is
a vector of control variables at the municipality level.
Since the political exclusion treatment is defined for each municipality, standard
errors are clustered at the municipality level. I also estimate the baseline model consid-
ering mean social capital outcomes in each municipality. By doing so, I am restricting
the sample to 57 observations, which makes hypotheses tests more demanding.
2.4.2 Conditions for identification
The empirical setting above uses the NF event in order to measure a political exclu-
sion treatment. This can be understood as a quasi-experimental setting if the following
conditions hold.
First, individuals should be comparable among treated and control municipalities.
An important step in that direction is to know what makes treated municipalities dif-
ferent from non-treated, in order to avoid that the estimated treatment effect captures
influences on social capital other than that of political exclusion. Table 2.1 reports
results of a mean comparison test between treated and non-treated municipalities for
covariates before and after the treatment. For this purpose a binary treatment is now
18Central region (including Bogotá), Atlantic coast, Pacific-north, south-west, ‘Viejo Caldas’-Antioquia
(region associated with coffee production in Colombia), and ‘Santanderes’ in the north-east (formed by
two departments: Santander and Norte de Santander).
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used.19
Treated municipalities have, on average, a significantly greater population size and
urbanization rate in 1951 as well as in 2005. On the one hand, a larger population size
may reflect a higher level of economic activity, but also the fact that individuals are
more exposed to an unfamiliar environment (i.e. to treat with strangers). On the other
hand, urbanization is likely related with the type of economic activities performed
(treated municipalities have indeed a significantly lower share of the population in the
agricultural sector), and may also be a measure of population density, both of which
might be able to explain differences in social capital. Hence, I control for population
size and urbanization rate in 1951 and 2005, as well as for share of the population in
the agricultural sector in 2005.
Bigger and more urbanized municipalities considerably attract migrants from many
regions in Colombia, and this fact could be the reason why these municipalities ex-
hibit a greater dispersion of political preferences and lower levels of trust. Although
the mean share of immigrants (including Colombians from other departments) is not
significantly different between treated and non-treated municipalities, I control for the
latter measure in the model.
Geographical conditions can also tell how a given community is organized and
which incentives it may have for cooperation. I include altitude, as well as the presence
of main export mineral resources in Colombia, namely gold, emeralds and coal, as
control variables in the model.
Treated and control municipalities significantly differ in poverty and inequality
outcomes measured by the unsatisfied basic needs index –ubn- and gini coefficient,
respectively. Along with them, schooling years of the population in 2005 and literacy
rate in 1951 also differ between treatment and control group. It is then meaningful to
observe these development features in the model, as they not only affect social capital,
but might be also an outcome of social capital in the past. Unobserved development
characteristics at the municipality level are captured by distance to the department
capital city (thereby also controlling for the capital-city effect).
Whereas differences in municipalities’ development are important to explain so-
cial capital outcomes, I am also able to observe individual characteristics from the
19A municipality is treated if political exclusion is higher than 1%. 20 out of 57 municipalities are
considered treated in Table 2.1, where the median value of political exclusion is 0,09%. This value indicates
the lowest positive electoral share of non-traditional parties, which means that 28 municipalities have no
electoral share of these parties before the NF. Although this value would be a natural treatment threshold
for the purposes in Table 2.1, I take a higher, more conservative threshold.
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Barcas survey. Individual covariates used in the model are exogenous for answers
measuring social capital, but can very likely explain differences in trust levels or per-
ception of free-riding behaviors. Individuals belonging to ethnic minorities have a
broader history of exclusion (not only from the political system) and are likely to
share many cultural characteristics within their groups. Hence, I capture variation in
social capital coming from these historical differences using dummy variables that in-
dicate the membership to black ethnicity and indigenous ethnicity. On the other hand,
individuals in the sample that have been affected by the armed conflict in Colombia
can be identified. They probably exhibit lower levels of trust given their particular
experiences and this is captured by including a victim dummy variable. It is also
possible to observe if political violence from the period 1948-1953 (violence 1948-1953)
was present in a given municipality. This well-known period of violence in Colom-
bia (which led to the military coup in 1953, and this, in turn, to the NF) may have
damaged social capital and led to particular attitudes towards parties and democracy.
Finally, region fixed effects defined in the previous subsection allow capturing
any unobservable characteristics that are common within these regions, which are
probably the outcome of the country’s historical development. In this sense, I can be
more confident about the orthogonality of the treatment with respect to unobservable
variables.
A second condition for identification (or a particular case from the first condition) is
that individuals with a specific level of social capital did not select into non-traditional
parties. Despite the above mentioned set of controls at the individual and the mu-
nicipality level, we may still be concerned that individuals with a lower social capital
selected into non-traditional parties before the NF, and just because of cultural trans-
mission we would observe worse social capital outcomes for treated municipalities
today. In order to deal with this possibility, I would like to have a measure of social
capital in the past or some observable that be an outcome of social capital. Following
the literature,20 electoral turnout should be a good outcome measure of social capi-
tal: It is likely to reflect civism and cooperation among individuals in a society and,
in general, it expresses revealed behavior rather than stated preference. It is also a
measure that is often available and comparable between periods of time within a same
place (advantage that is used in the next subsection). I thus extend the baseline model
by adding mean electoral turnout at the municipality level before the NF (1941-1947)
as a regressor.
20See Putnam (1995), Ostrom (2000), Fowler (2006).
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2.4.3 Using electoral turnout as dependent variable
As an alternative to the cross-sectional survey data approach delineated above, I
use a panel of electoral turnout data to test if political exclusion implied by the NF
affected the evolution of this variable. Electoral turnout at the department level in the
period 1947-2006 (with gaps) is used in two different panel fixed effects models.
With the first model I want to establish the average effect of the NF treatment, and
this model is given by:
turnoutdt = µd + δt + β postNFt · political exclusiond + εdt (2.2)
where µd are department fixed effects, δt are time fixed effects and postNFt · political exclusiond
is the interaction term between the treatment measure at the department level and a
dummy variable that takes the value of one since 1974 onwards (i.e. the period after
the NF).
The second model is described by:
turnoutdt = µd + δt + ∑
τ
βτ · dτ · political exclusiond + εdt (2.3)
This model allows the estimation of the treatment effect for each year before and
after the NF (dτ are time dummies, where τ is an index for every year except for
one). This is meaningful in that now it is possible to observe pre-trends according to
treatment level, although the effect of political exclusion should be only observed after
the treatment. Thus, it allows for a ‘placebo’ exercise.
It is worth noting several other advantages of the empirical setting proposed in this
subsection. First, it allows capturing observed and unobserved characteristics that are
time-invariant and specific to each department.21 It also captures the effect of other
events in the recent country history that may have affected electoral turnout in a given
year within the time span used here. Foremost, the panel setting allows observing the
timing of the political exclusion effect and what might have happened to social capital
(as measured by electoral turnout) during the years right after the NF.
21Several factors may cause systematic differences in electoral turnout across departments, for instance,
historical attitudes towards democracy. These are captured by department fixed effects.
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2.5 Results
Estimates for the baseline model are shown in columns (1) and (5) in Table 2.2.22 A
higher political exclusion treatment, as measured by the mean electoral share of non-
traditional parties before the NF, is significantly associated with lower levels of trust
and with a higher perception of free-riding behaviors. To understand the magnitude of
the coefficients, one can relate the estimated effect to a one-standard-deviation change
in political exclusion. Increasing the level of political exclusion by one standard deviation
reduces the probability that an individual trusts most people by 2 percentage points,
or, equivalently, by 27% of one standard deviation in the trust variable. The same
change in the treatment also increases the perception that others will take advantage
by 36% of one standard deviation in the fair variable.
I include the proxy for social capital before the NF (mean electoral turnout) in
columns (2) and (6). The estimated treatment effect is slightly lower, but still significant
for both outcomes (at the 10% level with the trust variable). Mean electoral turnout in
the period before the treatment is not significant in either case.
[Table 2.2 here]
Using social capital outcomes aggregated at the municipality level in columns (3),
(4), (7) and (8), rather than at the individual level, results from the previous regressions
are confirmed for the fair variable. The treatment preserves its negative association
with the trust variable, although its coefficient is not statistically significant.
Table 2.3 reports estimates for the panel fixed effects models using electoral turnout
at the department level as dependent variable. After controlling for time fixed effects,
a higher political exclusion imposed by the NF is significantly associated with a lower
average electoral turnout after the treatment (column (1)).
Figure 2.3 shows a corresponding picture. To allow for a graphic representation of
the relationship, a binary treatment definition is used (department is treated if mean
electoral share of non-traditional parties before the NF is higher than 0.5%)23. Electoral
turnout is very similar among treated and non-treated departments before and during
the NF, but for all the period after 1974 treated departments have always a clearly
22Table 2.2 reports OLS estimates. Logit and ordered logit estimates in tables 2.15 and 2.16 (in the
Appendix) confirm results presented here.
23
0,5% is approximately the median value of mean electoral share of non-traditional parties in 1943-
1951.
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lower level of electoral participation.24
Figure 2.3: Mean electoral turnout among Colombian departments 1947 - 2006
Notes: Vertical lines delimit the National Front period. This graph includes 23 departments since the treatment mea-
sure is not available for the remaining 9 Colombian departments. Treated departments by the National Front are
defined in this graph as the ones with a mean electoral share of non-traditional parties higher than 0.5% (approxi-
mately the median) for the period 1943-1951.
Column (2) in Table 2.3 shows estimated coefficients for interaction terms between
the treatment measure and year dummies, where the omitted interaction term is the
one for 1962. A higher mean electoral share of non-traditional parties before the NF is
only significantly related to lower electoral turnout for years after the NF, namely, the
period 1986-2002. In other words, non-treated and treated departments do not seem to
be in different trends before the NF, whereas they clearly diverge after the treatment.
[Table 2.3 here]
24Figure 2.7 displays mean standardized turnout after the NF across departments in the Colombian
map. The mean standardized turnout in a given department tells, on average for the period after the
NF, by how many standard deviations (and in which direction) electoral turnout deviates from the mean
electoral turnout in a given year.
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Coefficients have a negative sign for all the period after the treatment, and they
start to be statistically significant after the first three election years right after the NF.
A simple intuition would tell that individuals were more willing to vote in the first
election years for which alternative parties were allowed again to participate, and that
this effect should have been stronger among departments with a higher treatment.
This is clear in Figure 2.3 if electoral turnout in 1974 is considered (first elections
with other parties). However, it is likely that the constitutional reform of 1968, which
extended power sharing at some levels until 1986 (see footnote 8), made people feel
their voting efforts were in vain.
These results suggest that political exclusion imposed by the NF implied a deteri-
oration of civic engagement. In such a way, a negative association between political
exclusion in the past and social capital in 2011, as reported by the estimates in Table
2.2, is more likely to be causally interpreted.
2.5.1 Robustness checks
I perform two alternative placebo treatments in the baseline model. First, I use the
same measure of the treatment –mean electoral share of non-traditional parties- for
the period 1994-2010 (mean other 1994-2010).25 Second, I use mean electoral share of
communist parties for the period 1994-2002 (mean communist 1994-2002).26 Although
the former seems by definition a more natural placebo, it is worth noting the following:
The communist party was the main actor among non-traditional parties before the NF,
and a large number of non-traditional parties have emerged today. An additional
advantage of the recent electoral share of communist parties, besides being a more
precise placebo, is that it allows checking for ideology effects on social capital. Both
placebos aim at clarifying the same concern: If there is something about the treatment
measure that is related to social capital and that I cannot observe, this measure today
should be correlated with social capital and should capture any effect that does not
respond to political exclusion by the NF.
Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 show OLS estimates for trust and fair at the individual level,
25Only independent parties are taken as non-traditional, not the different ones that have emerged from
the Liberal and Conservative parties. These independent parties comprise left-wing parties, minorities’
political movements and parties that have emerged to support independent candidates.
26There is no registered participation of communist parties after 2002 for Chamber elections, which
are the ones considered throughout this study precisely because of their historically greater diversity of
political parties.
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respectively.27 Columns (1) and (2) report again the baseline model results for com-
parison. Columns (3) and (5) show estimates using one placebo treatment at a time,
and columns (4) and (6) include both the treatment and one of its measures today. For
both dependent variables, placebo treatments are not significant, and when including
the treatment and its measures today, mean electoral share of non-traditional parties
before the NF is equally significant, bigger in magnitude, while the same measures to-
day are not (except for the mean other coefficient in explaining the trust variable, which
is significant at the 10% level).
[Table 2.4 here]
[Table 2.5 here]
I perform a propensity score approach in order to make municipalities comparable
before the treatment. I use (log) altitude, distance to department capital city, presence
of violence between 1948 and 1953, population, share of urban population and literacy
rate in 1951, as well as mean turnout in 1941-1947, as pre-treatment characteristics
to predict the probability of having a mean electoral share of non-traditional parties
higher than 1% before the NF. This procedure suggests blocks of municipalities that
can be considered comparable at the baseline (with the same propensity); I then create
a dummy for each block of municipalities and include these dummies in the previous
regressions with the continuous treatment. Estimates are presented in columns (7)-(12)
of tables 2.4 and 2.5. All previous results concerning the political exclusion treatment
are robust to this within-propensity-blocks analysis, and none of the placebo measures
is significant to explain social capital outcomes in any specification.28
Migration during and after the NF treatment could be a concern, as it might di-
lute the observed effects or even lead to spurious correlations. I therefore estimate the
different specifications in columns (1)-(6) using regressions weighted by the share of
non-immigrants in each municipality in 2005.29 Results for these weighted regressions
are shown in Table 2.14 in the Appendix and they lead to same conclusions as before:
A higher political exclusion treatment is significantly associated with a higher percep-
tion of free-riding behaviors and lower trust levels, also after controlling for a proxy
27Logit and ordered logit estimates are shown in tables 2.15 and 2.16 in the Appendix and they lead to
the same conclusions as the results presented here.
28These results are confirmed by logit and ordered logit estimates in tables 2.15 and 2.16.
29Unfortunately, I am not able to know the year of migration of individuals born in Colombia. Thus, I
am also including in immigrants those people who had already migrated before the NF. These are likely
to be few in 2005.
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of past social capital; measures of the treatment today are not significantly related to
social capital outcomes.30
[Table 2.14 here]
2.6 Investigating the channel
The hypothesized channel through which political exclusion about 50 years ago
can explain social capital differences today is distrust towards the state. In that case,
variation in political exclusion across regions should lead to a corresponding variation
in this channel. To the extent that abstentionism reflects distrust towards the state,
electoral turnout results presented in the previous section would support the idea that
the NF had a differential effect, and that regions facing a higher political exclusion due
to the NF are the ones with lower levels of trust towards the state after the treatment.
I further investigate the proposed channel using direct measures of state perception
from the Barcas social capital survey, namely corruption perception in public offices
(corruption) and the perception that state’s decisions are not applied equally to every-
body (all equal). First, I want to establish if political exclusion affected these measures.
I perform the same regressions as before, but now with state perception as dependent
variable. Results for these regressions are shown in Table 2.6 at the individual and
municipality level, as well as in Table 2.7 (for corruption) and Table 2.8 (for all equal) in-
cluding robustness checks.31 They indicate that a higher political exclusion treatment
is associated with a higher perception of corruption in the state, where this association
becomes significant (at the 10% level) for the within-propensity-blocks analysis. On
the other hand, the NF treatment is not clearly related to the perception that state’s
decisions are not applied equally to everybody.
[Table 2.6 here]
[Table 2.7 here]
[Table 2.8 here]
Second, I want to verify the extent to which the treatment affects social capital
through the suggested channel. For this purpose, I proceed in two steps. I first relate
30Table 2.17 and Table 2.18 in the Appendix show robustness checks with trust and fair aggregated at
the municipality level, rather than at the individual level, as dependent variables.
31See tables 2.19 and 2.20 in the Appendix for ordered logit estimates.
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state perception measures with social capital outcomes (odd columns in tables 2.9 and
2.10), and next I include both, the channel and the political exclusion treatment, as
explanatory variables for social capital (even columns in tables 2.9 and 2.10).32 I have
to note that for this part of the exercise I can only determine correlations between
state perception and social capital, rather than causal relationships, as it is hard to
establish if it is just because individuals have low levels of trust that they also distrust
the state as any other agent, or if the reverse is true. Nevertheless, these correlations
are reported here for the purpose of linking the channel to the outcomes.
[Table 2.9 here]
[Table 2.10 here]
Table 2.9 indicates that a higher corruption perception is related to lower trust
levels and a higher perception of free-riding behaviors. This significant relationship
is also observed when including the political exclusion treatment, which is still sig-
nificant, although lower in magnitude, to explain social capital outcomes. Table 2.10
reports a significant association between the perception that state’s decisions are not
equally applied to everybody (all equal) and perception of free-riding behaviors. The
political exclusion treatment is again significant to explain both social capital out-
comes.
Results for the corruption variable may support the proposed channel in this paper:
More politically excluded places would have a stronger feeling that individuals in
power work for their own interests, which might have led to generalized selfishness
and distrust. Nonetheless, results suggest that political exclusion still matters for social
capital outcomes when controlling for the proposed channel. On the one hand, it is
likely that state perception variables today cannot fully reflect state perception during
and right after the treatment, which is the one argued to have undermined social
capital. The latter could also explain why the treatment is not significantly related in
some cases to state perception measures today. On the other hand, this can be evidence
that political exclusion may have had an effect on social capital through other channels,
as well.
An important possible channel to explore is presence of violence. As indicated
by qualitative evidence, political exclusion produced violence against the state with
the emergence of guerrilla groups during the NF period. If more politically excluded
32corruption is the explanatory variable of interest in Table 2.9 and all equal in Table 2.10. Table 2.21 in
the Appendix shows regressions weighted by the share of non-immigrants for this exercise, and tables
2.22 and 2.23 present logit and ordered logit estimates.
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places had to suffer from a heavier and longer presence of violent groups, violence
(coming from these groups or their opponents) could be the means by which social
capital got damaged in treated places. Regressions in Table 2.11 examine if political
exclusion is related to presence (share of years with presence within the periods 1985-
1992 and 1993-2010) of ELN and FARC guerrilla groups, AUC paramilitary group
(1993-2010) and to total attacks against civilians coming from any group as a share of
total population (1993-2010). Results indicate no significant relationship between the
treatment and violence measures, also when performing the within-propensity-blocks
estimation.
[Table 2.11 here]
Tables 2.12 and 2.13 relate violence measures, as well as these measures together
with the treatment, to social capital outcomes. No general significant association can
be verified between violence measures and social capital, whereas the treatment is
always significant to explain trust levels or perception of free-riding. These results may
seem surprising, as one would expect a clear negative relationship between violence
and social capital. However, it is possible to think that individuals have incentives to
preserve or increase cooperation if they are facing a clear common threat.
[Table 2.12 here]
[Table 2.13 here]
2.7 Conclusion
This paper gives evidence for Colombia that political inequality may be an impor-
tant cause of low social capital, this measured by generalized trust levels and percep-
tion of free-riding behaviors. I use an important institutional agreement in Colombia
in order to test the effect of political exclusion on social capital. This was the National
Front agreement, which for 16 years, between 1958 and 1974, established that political
power could only be shared by the two traditional parties in that country. The Na-
tional Front, although only a little part in the political inequality history in Colombia,
gives the opportunity to test the effect of a formal institutionalized political exclusion
that affected all regions in the country at the same time, even though with differential
effects according to the initial political diversity in each region.
Since this source of variation in the treatment is not likely exogenous for social
capital, the empirical strategy seeks the identification of a causal effect of political
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exclusion. I find that the National Front treatment (defined as the mean electoral share
of non-traditional parties in 1941-1951) is associated with less trusting individuals
today and with a higher perception of free-riding behaviors.
Additional evidence that political exclusion implied a deterioration of social capital
is given by a decline in electoral turnout. Departments facing a higher political exclu-
sion have, on average, a lower electoral turnout for all the period after the National
Front and this negative association is only significant for years after the treatment. On
the other hand, this finding also supports the idea that distrust towards the state may
be a channel through which political exclusion in the past is able to explain social
capital today.
Using survey measures of state perception today, results indicate that a higher
National Front treatment is associated with a higher perception of corruption in the
state, and this, in turn, is associated with lower social capital outcomes.
Political inequality may harm social capital, but can a low social capital explain
the persistence of political inequality? In the following, I will sketch some possible
explanations on why this could be the case. Distrust and free riding make elites more
prone to work for their particular interests, as these features are also part of their
behavior. A lower social capital, on the other hand, is likely to facilitate corruption,
as there are more citizens willing to do favors for money or pay for personal favors
(accept or give bribes), and so they ease the persistence of corrupt individuals in power.
Finally, distrust and free riding represent an obstacle for the society to converge into
unified objectives and to demand socially optimal institutions. As a result, institutions
may become even more dependent on the ruling elite.
The idea behind this study implies that social capital responds to incentives and
thus should not be understood as a country fixed endowment. Furthermore, this
paper wants to provide an argument for the idea that formal institutions also matter
through their effect on social capital, or more precisely in this case, that social capital
may be an important channel through which political inequality has been central for
Colombian development. Therefore, this paper may contribute to the literature that
examines how social capital is formed (or damaged), how political institutions are
relevant for economic development, and to the literature on the persistence of culture
and institutions.
Further research on social capital in the context of developing countries is not only
relevant for its potential direct effects on economic development, but it should be of
interest given the extent to which it allows the persistence of other main causes of un-
derdevelopment. Such an analysis would help to fill a gap in the range of development
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policies.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
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(Continuation) Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
Notes: Municipalities are divided into treatment and control group according to a binary treatment,
which takes the value of one if mean electoral share of non-traditional parties is higher than 1% for the
period 1941-1951. Difference in means between treated and non-treated municipalities is: *** Statistically
significant at the 1% level; ** statistically significant at the 5% level; * statistically significant at the 10%
level.
Table 2.2: OLS estimates at the individual and municipality level for social capital outcomes
Notes: 1) Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the municipality level. 2) Robust standard errors in
brackets. All specifications controlling for region fixed effects, individuals with black ethnicity (2011),
indigenous ethnicity (2011), victims of violence (2011), population size (1951 and 2005), share of urban
population (1951 and 2005), literacy (1951), share of immigrants including Colombians from other de-
partments (2005), mean schooling years (2005), share of the population in the agriculture sector (2005),
(log) altitude, distance to the department capital city, presence of violence between 1948 and 1953, un-
satisfied basic needs index ubn-(2005), gini (2002), presence of gold or emeralds and presence of coal
(2000). ***Statistically significant at the 1% level; **statistically significant at the 5% level; *statistically
significant at the 10% level.
78
Political Inequality and the Origins of Distrust
Table 2.3: Panel fixed effects estimates for electoral turnout across Colombian departments as
dependent variable
Notes: 23 departments are used for these regressions since the treatment mea-
sure is not available for the remaining 9 Colombian departments. Both specifica-
tions include time fixed effects. The omitted interaction term in column (2) is the
one for 1962. ***Statistically significant at the 1% level; **statistically significant
at the 5% level; *statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Table 2.4: OLS regressions for trust as dependent variable
Notes: Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the municipality level. All specifications controlling for region fixed effects, individuals with black ethnicity
(2011), indigenous ethnicity (2011), victims of violence (2011), population size (2005), share of urban population (2005), share of immigrants including Colombians
from other departments (2005), mean schooling years (2005), share of the population in the agriculture sector (2005), unsatisfied basic needs index ubn-(2005),
gini (2002), presence of gold or emeralds and presence of coal (2000). Regressions (1)-(6) also controlling for pre-treatment characteristics: (log) altitude,
distance to the department capital city, presence of violence between 1948 and 1953, population size (1951), share of urban population (1951) and literacy rate
(1951). Regressions (7)-(12) include dummies for blocks of the propensity score, which is calculated with pre-treatment characteristics above and mean turnout
(1941-1947).
***Statistically significant at the 1% level; **statistically significant at the 5% level; *statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Table 2.5: OLS regressions for fair as dependent variable
Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the municipality level. All specifications controlling for region fixed effects, individuals with black ethnicity (2011),
indigenous ethnicity (2011), victims of violence (2011), population size (2005), share of urban population (2005), share of immigrants including Colombians
from other departments (2005), mean schooling years (2005), share of the population in the agriculture sector (2005), unsatisfied basic needs index ubn-(2005),
gini (2002), presence of gold or emeralds and presence of coal (2000). Regressions (1)-(6) also controlling for pre-treatment characteristics: (log) altitude,
distance to the department capital city, presence of violence between 1948 and 1953, population size (1951), share of urban population (1951) and literacy rate
(1951). Regressions (7)-(12) include dummies for blocks of the propensity score, which is calculated with pre-treatment characteristics above and mean turnout
(1941-1947).
***Statistically significant at the 1% level; **statistically significant at the 5% level.
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Table 2.6: OLS estimates at the individual and municipality level for state perception measures
1) Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the municipality level. 2) Robust standard errors in brack-
ets. Higher values for corruption and all equal indicate a higher perception of corruption and that state’s
decisions are not equally applied to everybody. All specifications controlling for region fixed effects, in-
dividuals with black ethnicity (2011), indigenous ethnicity (2011), victims of violence (2011), population
size (1951 and 2005), share of urban population (1951 and 2005), literacy (1951), share of immigrants
including Colombians from other departments (2005), mean schooling years (2005), share of the popu-
lation in the agriculture sector (2005), (log) altitude, distance to the department capital city, presence of
violence between 1948 and 1953, unsatisfied basic needs index ubn-(2005), gini (2002), presence of gold
or emeralds and presence of coal (2000). *Statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Table 2.7: OLS regressions for corruption as dependent variable
Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the municipality level. All specifications controlling for region fixed effects, individuals with black ethnicity (2011),
indigenous ethnicity (2011), victims of violence (2011), population size (2005), share of urban population (2005), share of immigrants including Colombians from
other departments (2005), mean schooling years (2005), share of the population in the agriculture sector (2005), unsatisfied basic needs index ubn-(2005), gini
(2002), presence of gold or emeralds and presence of coal (2000). Regressions (1)-(6) also controlling for pretreatment characteristics: (log) altitude, distance
to the department capital city, presence of violence between 1948 and 1953, population size (1951), share of urban population (1951) and literacy rate (1951).
Regressions (7)-(12) include dummies for blocks of the propensity score, which is calculated with pre-treatment characteristics above and mean turnout (1941-
1947). *Statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Table 2.8: OLS regressions for all equal as dependent variable
Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the municipality level. All specifications controlling for region fixed effects, individuals with black ethnicity (2011),
indigenous ethnicity (2011), victims of violence (2011), population size (2005), share of urban population (2005), share of immigrants including Colombians from
other departments (2005), mean schooling years (2005), share of the population in the agriculture sector (2005), unsatisfied basic needs index ubn-(2005), gini
(2002), presence of gold or emeralds and presence of coal (2000). Regressions (1)-(6) also controlling for pretreatment characteristics: (log) altitude, distance
to the department capital city, presence of violence between 1948 and 1953, population size (1951), share of urban population (1951) and literacy rate (1951).
Regressions (7)-(12) include dummies for blocks of the propensity score, which is calculated with pre-treatment characteristics above and mean turnout (1941-
1947). *Statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Table 2.9: OLS regressions for social capital outcomes -corruption as explanatory variable of interest
Table 2.10: OLS regressions for social capital outcomes -all equal as explanatory variable of interest
Notes: Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the municipality level. All specifications controlling for region fixed effects, individuals with black ethnicity
(2011), indigenous ethnicity (2011), victims of violence (2011), population size (2005), share of urban population (2005), share of immigrants including Colombians
from other departments (2005), mean schooling years (2005), share of the population in the agriculture sector (2005), unsatisfied basic needs index ubn-(2005), gini
(2002), presence of gold or emeralds and presence of coal (2000). Within-pscore-blocks regressions include dummies for blocks of the propensity score, which is
calculated with pre-treatment characteristics ((log) altitude, distance to the department capital city, presence of violence between 1948 and 1953, population size
(1951), share of urban population (1951) and literacy rate (1951)) and mean turnout (1941-1947). Remaining regressions control for pre-treatment characteristics,
as well. ***Statistically significant at the 1% level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level. *Statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Table 2.11: OLS regressions for violence measures at the municipality level as dependent variables
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. All specifications controlling for region fixed effects, individuals with black ethnicity (2011), indigenous ethnicity
(2011), victims of violence (2011), population size (2005), share of urban population (2005), share of immigrants including Colombians from other departments
(2005), mean schooling years (2005), share of the population in the agriculture sector (2005), unsatisfied basic needs index ubn-(2005), gini (2002), presence of
gold or emeralds and presence of coal (2000). Regressions in the top panel also control for pre-treatment characteristics: (log) altitude, distance to the department
capital city, presence of violence between 1948 and 1953, population size (1951), share of urban population (1951) and literacy rate (1951). Within-pscore-blocks
regressions include dummies for blocks of the propensity score, which is calculated with pre-treatment characteristics above and mean turnout (1941-1947).
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Table 2.12: OLS regressions for trust -violence measures as explanatory variables of interest
Notes: Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the municipality level. All specifications controlling for region fixed effects, individuals with black ethnicity
(2011), indigenous ethnicity (2011), population size (1951 and 2005), share of urban population (1951 and 2005), literacy (1951), share of immigrants including
Colombians from other departments (2005), mean schooling years (2005), share of the population in the agriculture sector (2005), (log) altitude, distance to the
department capital city, presence of violence between 1948 and 1953, unsatisfied basic needs index ubn-(2005), gini (2002), presence of gold or emeralds and
presence of coal (2000). **Statistically significant at the 5% level.
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Table 2.13: OLS regressions for fair -violence measures as explanatory variables of interest
Notes: Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the municipality level. All specifications controlling for region fixed effects, individuals with black ethnicity
(2011), indigenous ethnicity (2011), population size (1951 and 2005), share of urban population (1951 and 2005), literacy (1951), share of immigrants including
Colombians from other departments (2005), mean schooling years (2005), share of the population in the agriculture sector (2005), (log) altitude, distance to the
department capital city, presence of violence between 1948 and 1953, unsatisfied basic needs index ubn-(2005), gini (2002), presence of gold or emeralds and
presence of coal (2000). ***Statistically significant at the 1% level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level.
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Figure 2.4: Municipalities in the sample according to a binary treatment definition
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Notes: Treated municipalities in this graph are the ones with mean electoral share of
non-traditional parties in 1941-1951 higher than 1%. Circle size is proportional to (log)
municipality population.
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Figure 2.5: Mean trust at the municipal level
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Notes: Legend indicates the share of individuals who answered that most people
can be trusted. Circle size is proportional to (log) municipality population.
Figure 2.6: Mean fair at the municipal level
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Notes: fair ranges from 1 (people take advantage) to 10 (people are fair). Circle
size is proportional to (log) municipality population.
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Figure 2.7: Standardized electoral turnout after treatment (1974 - 2006) across departments
Notes: The color scale indicates the mean value for the period 1974 - 2006 (after the NF) of the standardized
turnout in each year (i.e. how many standard deviations does electoral turnout deviates from the mean electoral
turnout in a given year). Regions bordered with a thicker line are used for defining region fixed effects in the
empirical strategy.
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Table 2.14: OLS regressions weighted by non-immigrants for social capital outcomes
Notes: Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the municipality level. All specifications controlling for region fixed effects, individuals with black ethnicity
(2011), indigenous ethnicity (2011), population size (1951 and 2005), share of urban population (1951 and 2005), literacy (1951), share of immigrants including
Colombians from other departments (2005), mean schooling years (2005), share of the population in the agriculture sector (2005), (log) altitude, distance to the
department capital city, presence of violence between 1948 and 1953, unsatisfied basic needs index ubn-(2005), gini (2002), presence of gold or emeralds and
presence of coal (2000). ***Statistically significant at the 1% level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level. *Statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Table 2.15: Logit regressions for trust as dependent variable
Notes: Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the municipality level. All specifications controlling for region fixed effects, individuals with black ethnicity
(2011), indigenous ethnicity (2011), victims of violence (2011), population size (2005), share of urban population (2005), share of immigrants including Colombians
from other departments (2005), mean schooling years (2005), share of the population in the agriculture sector (2005), unsatisfied basic needs index ubn-(2005),
gini (2002), presence of gold or emeralds and presence of coal (2000). Regressions (1)-(12) also controlling for pre-treatment characteristics: (log) altitude,
distance to the department capital city, presence of violence between 1948 and 1953, population size (1951), share of urban population (1951) and literacy rate
(1951). Regressions (13)-(18) include dummies for blocks of the propensity score, which is calculated with pre-treatment characteristics above and mean turnout
(1941-1947).***Statistically significant at the 1% level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level. *Statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Table 2.16: Ordered logit regressions for fair as dependent variable
Notes: Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the municipality level. All specifications controlling for region fixed effects, individuals with black ethnicity
(2011), indigenous ethnicity (2011), victims of violence (2011), population size (2005), share of urban population (2005), share of immigrants including Colombians
from other departments (2005), mean schooling years (2005), share of the population in the agriculture sector (2005), unsatisfied basic needs index ubn-(2005),
gini (2002), presence of gold or emeralds and presence of coal (2000). Regressions (1)-(12) also controlling for pre-treatment characteristics: (log) altitude,
distance to the department capital city, presence of violence between 1948 and 1953, population size (1951), share of urban population (1951) and literacy rate
(1951). Regressions (13)-(18) include dummies for blocks of the propensity score, which is calculated with pre-treatment characteristics above and mean turnout
(1941-1947). ***Statistically significant at the 1% level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level.
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Table 2.17: OLS regressions for mean trust at the municipality level as dependent variable
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. All specifications controlling for region fixed effects, individuals with black ethnicity (2011), indigenous ethnicity
(2011), victims of violence (2011), population size (2005), share of urban population (2005), share of immigrants including Colombians from other departments
(2005), mean schooling years (2005), share of the population in the agriculture sector (2005), unsatisfied basic needs index ubn-(2005), gini (2002), presence of
gold or emeralds and presence of coal (2000). Regressions (1)-(8) also controlling for pre-treatment characteristics: (log) altitude, distance to the department
capital city, presence of violence between 1948 and 1953, population size (1951), share of urban population (1951) and literacy rate (1951). Regressions (9)-(12)
include dummies for blocks of the propensity score, which is calculated with pre-treatment characteristics above and mean turnout (1941-1947). *Statistically
significant at the 10% level.
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Table 2.18: OLS regressions for mean fair at the municipality level as dependent variable
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. All specifications controlling for region fixed effects, individuals with black ethnicity (2011), indigenous ethnicity
(2011), victims of violence (2011), population size (2005), share of urban population (2005), share of immigrants including Colombians from other departments
(2005), mean schooling years (2005), share of the population in the agriculture sector (2005), unsatisfied basic needs index ubn-(2005), gini (2002), presence of
gold or emeralds and presence of coal (2000). Regressions (1)-(8) also controlling for pre-treatment characteristics: (log) altitude, distance to the department
capital city, presence of violence between 1948 and 1953, population size (1951), share of urban population (1951) and literacy rate (1951). Regressions (9)-(12)
include dummies for blocks of the propensity score, which is calculated with pre-treatment characteristics above and mean turnout (1941-1947). ***Statistically
significant at the 1% level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level. *Statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Table 2.19: Ordered logit regressions for corruption as dependent variable
Notes: Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the municipality level. All specifications controlling for region fixed effects, individuals with black ethnicity
(2011), indigenous ethnicity (2011), victims of violence (2011), population size (2005), share of urban population (2005), share of immigrants including Colombians
from other departments (2005), mean schooling years (2005), share of the population in the agriculture sector (2005), unsatisfied basic needs index ubn-(2005),
gini (2002), presence of gold or emeralds and presence of coal (2000). Regressions (1)-(12) also controlling for pre-treatment characteristics: (log) altitude,
distance to the department capital city, presence of violence between 1948 and 1953, population size (1951), share of urban population (1951) and literacy rate
(1951). Regressions (13)-(18) include dummies for blocks of the propensity score, which is calculated with pre-treatment characteristics above and mean turnout
(1941-1947).*Statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Table 2.20: Ordered logit regressions for all equal as dependent variable
Notes: Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the municipality level. All specifications controlling for region fixed effects, individuals with black ethnicity
(2011), indigenous ethnicity (2011), victims of violence (2011), population size (2005), share of urban population (2005), share of immigrants including Colombians
from other departments (2005), mean schooling years (2005), share of the population in the agriculture sector (2005), unsatisfied basic needs index ubn-(2005),
gini (2002), presence of gold or emeralds and presence of coal (2000). Regressions (1)-(12) also controlling for pre-treatment characteristics: (log) altitude,
distance to the department capital city, presence of violence between 1948 and 1953, population size (1951), share of urban population (1951) and literacy rate
(1951). Regressions (13)-(18) include dummies for blocks of the propensity score, which is calculated with pre-treatment characteristics above and mean turnout
(1941-1947). *Statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Table 2.21: OLS regressions weighted by non-immigrants –state perception measures as explanatory variables of interest
Notes: Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the municipality level. All specifications controlling for region fixed effects, individuals with black ethnicity
(2011), indigenous ethnicity (2011), population size (1951 and 2005), share of urban population (1951 and 2005), literacy (1951), share of immigrants including
Colombians from other departments (2005), mean schooling years (2005), share of the population in the agriculture sector (2005), (log) altitude, distance to the
department capital city, presence of violence between 1948 and 1953, unsatisfied basic needs index ubn-(2005), gini (2002), presence of gold or emeralds and
presence of coal (2000). ***Statistically significant at the 1% level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level.
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Table 2.22: Logit/Ordered logit regressions for social capital outcomes -corruption as explanatory variable of interest
Table 2.23: Logit/Ordered logit regressions for social capital outcomes -all equal as explanatory variable of interest
Notes: Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the municipality level. All specifications controlling for region fixed effects, individuals with black ethnicity
(2011), indigenous ethnicity (2011), victims of violence (2011), population size (2005), share of urban population (2005), share of immigrants including Colombians
from other departments (2005), mean schooling years (2005), share of the population in the agriculture sector (2005), unsatisfied basic needs index ubn-(2005), gini
(2002), presence of gold or emeralds and presence of coal (2000). Within-pscore-blocks regressions include dummies for blocks of the propensity score, which is
calculated with pre-treatment characteristics ((log) altitude, distance to the department capital city, presence of violence between 1948 and 1953, population size
(1951), share of urban population (1951) and literacy rate (1951)) and mean turnout (1941-1947). Remaining regressions control for pre-treatment characteristics,
as well.***Statistically significant at the 1% level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level.
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Chapter 3
The Long Run Influence of
Institutions Governing Trade: The
Case of Colonial and Pirates’ Ports
in Mexico1
3.1 Introduction
The idea that free commercial activity can lead to the improvement of households
and nations dates back to Ricardo’s On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation.
Indeed, a number of studies have documented how overseas trade can have positive
lasting effects for inter-ethnic cooperation and social peace (Jha, 2013); the emergence
of institutions favoring economic growth (Acemoglu et al., 2005a); or sectoral compo-
sition and geographical/social patterns of economic organization (Jia, 2014; Gaikwad,
2015). Despite these findings, the role of state institutions accompanying commercial
activities (e.g. for tax collection, organizing economic activity within a legal framework
or defense) is less well understood. In this paper we exploit variation in the institu-
tions governing trade between Spain and its American colonies to better understand
their long run influence.
Specifically, we examine the long-term development impact of overseas trade in
colonial Mexico conducted under two different institutional arrangements. The first
of them was established by the Spanish state in recognized colonial ports, where ship-
1This is joint work with Jenny Guardado, University of Chicago.
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ments of goods to and from Mexico were carefully overseen by the Spanish Crown
bureaucracy, so that the levy of taxes and colonial laws were enforced. Yet, this was
not the only way in which goods were traded with Mexico. In fact, a large share of
goods in colonial Mexico came from contraband occurring in “pirate-ports” or ports
in which goods were exchanged without the vigilant eye of the Crown; more pre-
cisely, with the explicit aim of avoiding colonial taxes and undermining the Spanish
trade monopoly. Based on this clear distinction between Spanish state institutions and
piracy, and using self-compiled historical records on the location of piracy and Span-
ish ports in New Spain (now Mexico), we assess how these institutional arrangements
affected long-term economic development.
The empirical challenge when studying the impact of these two different institu-
tional settings governing trade is that several conditions making trade profitable may
have also led to better economic outcomes in the long-run. Pre-treatment conditions
such as proximity to population and mineral resources may have driven the choice of
ports by colonizers and pirates. Our strategy deals with these concerns by: 1) Control-
ling for unobservables among close neighboring municipalities; 2) using the presence
of a colonial town as a proxy for municipal-specific characteristics related to develop-
ment potential, settlements and the presence of a local political organization; and 3)
identifying natural harbors along Mexican coastlines as a source of exogenous varia-
tion in the possibility to trade, thereby considering only municipalities with this clear
(and common) geographical advantage.
Our results show that being a Spanish or pirate port in the colonial period led to
significantly better long run development outcomes: A lower share of poor population,
lower share of population lacking basic utilities and higher municipal tax income per
capita. We further find that these results are not driven by a mechanical effect of
carrying out trade in the present. Results indicate, however, that the presence of piracy
is not significantly (or even negatively) related to some state presence outcomes as
the ratio of roads network over municipal surface and number of agents at the Public
Prosecution Office relative to population size, for which the presence of a Spanish port
is positively associated. This finding is consistent with the idea that state institutions
present in royal ports should have had an influence on public goods provision, as well
as on the later presence of the state.
Although the magnitude of the Spanish treatment effect is in many cases signifi-
cantly bigger than that of the piracy effect, our findings for piracy are rather surprising.
Conventional wisdom would assert that piracy was detrimental for economic growth
and development. Pirate ports were not only subject to attacks and pillage (which,
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according to evidence, were more likely at the beginning of the colonial period), but
also the state was either absent or weak, and thus no formal organization should have
fostered economic growth. Our results suggest that the long development of trade
since colonial times and the early relative prosperity of these places may have com-
pensated the damaging effects of lacking a state. In particular, free trade underlying
piracy activities, as opposed to a trade monopoly under Spanish rule, is a key factor
to understand our findings. Free trade likely led to a considerable volume of traded
goods and consumption, but also importantly to a broader merchant middle class.
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, consistent with other
papers, it indicates that historical trade implied important developments that go be-
yond its direct effects on economic activity. Acemoglu et al. (2005a) argue, for instance,
that Atlantic trade after 1500 induced fundamental institutional changes in Europe
depending on pre-existing institutions. In countries where initial political institutions
imposed constraints on the monarchy, Atlantic trade should have increased the power
of merchants to demand institutions favoring property rights. Our paper shows, in
contrast, that different institutions operating in Spanish colonies, as a result of this
trade, influenced the colonies’ later development.
In other contexts, Jha (2013) argues that inter-ethnic exchange in medieval trad-
ing ports in South Asia left a legacy of ethnic tolerance. More recently, Gaikwad
(2015) claims that the establishment of trading settlements in India before coloniza-
tion induced important economic transformations, not driven by formal institutions,
resulting in very long term effects. These two studies use the idea of natural harbors
as an exogenous endowment enabling trade. We use their approaches here in order to
identify natural harbors along Mexican coastlines.
Second, this paper provides additional evidence of the heterogeneous legacies from
different colonial activities.2 We study the long term effects of colonial trade, but also
of the prevalent different institutions governing this activity. Despite the strategic
value of trade for the colonial power, the long term effects of colonial trade have not
been extensively studied in former Spanish colonies. Piracy, although not classifiable
as a Spanish colonial institution, was spread throughout Spanish America as a by-
product of colonization. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to study
the long run effects of piracy in Spanish colonies.
While colonial institutions facilitating rent seeking and the profiting from office
2See, among others, Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), Bruhn and Gallego (2012) and Naritomi et. al.
(2012) for evidence on the long run impact of different type of colonial activities related to production
and resource extraction.
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have been found responsible for long-run underdevelopment (Guardado, 2015), other
studies highlight how certain investment decisions and tax-collection practices from
colonial times lead to better bureaucratic outcomes in Nigeria (Berger, 2009), lasting
public goods in West Africa (Huillery, 2009) or better investments in agriculture in
India (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005). In this paper we highlight the long-term beneficial
effect of colonial trade, despite the fact that trade was conducted under less than ideal
conditions.
Finally, this paper documents the importance of informal (de facto) institutions
in order to understand these legacies. As pointed out by other studies, the presence
of extractive colonial institutions may have created long-lasting incentives to deviate
from the law, this explaining a persistent gap between de jure and de facto institutions
(Alvarez-Villa (2014)). Deviating from an extractive colonial law can result beneficial,
as it was the case in commercial contracts between natives and state officials in colonial
Mexico: Diaz-Cayeros and Jha (2014) find that places where indigenous individuals
were better able to renege from unfavorable trade contracts and sell their crop on the
spot market are better off in the long run. Our paper complements this perspective:
Piracy and smuggling appeared as de facto institutions that had a significant role in the
colonies’ long run development. They emerged as a result of a rigid trade monopoly,
and constituted the main way in which the law was escaped in the trade sector of the
economy.3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents a brief his-
torical review on colonial trade and piracy in Spanish America. Our data is described
in section 3.3. In section 3.4 we explain our empirical strategy for the identification of
the Spanish and piracy treatment effects. Section 3.5 reports main results and robust-
ness checks. Finally, section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Colonial trade and piracy in Spanish America
For many scholars, overseas trade was a central feature of the colonial system link-
ing the Iberian metropolis to the colonial territories overseas. The commercial relations
between Madrid and the American territories can be best described as mercantilistic
for most of the colonial period.4 This approach to colonial trade followed both eco-
nomic thinking at the time and economic goals of the Crown. Colonial trade, or more
3See Alvarez-Villa (2014) for evidence in the colonial mining industry.
4This would change towards the end of the colonial period under Bourbon rule.
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precisely, “. . . a trade structure biased towards the metropolitan country became a nec-
essary condition for the economic exploitation of colonial territories” (Kleiman, 1976,
p. 459).
A trade monopoly with the colonies was important at securing a profitable market
for Spanish products, but also for having privileged access to novel goods. As it is
argued by Hersh and Voth (2009), an increased variety of goods resulting from colo-
nial trade may have raised European living standards after 1492. More important to
colonial powers, however, was the shipment of gold and silver from the colonies. The
trade monopoly also shielded colonies from direct access to foreign traders, thereby
reducing the likelihood that local production of gold and silver could be used to pur-
chase foreign goods, undermining the export of these precious metals to Spain. For
some historians, the discovery of large amounts of gold and silver in Spanish colonies
led to “one of the most rigid systems of state regulation of colonial trade ever adopted
by any country” (Hamilton, 1948, p. 41).
Finally, a monopoly on colonial trade also provided warranties to individuals will-
ing to engage in discovery and colonization. By acting as a guarantor, the monopoly
allowed enough capital to be raised for these purposes, despite of long waiting pe-
riods for returns, as well as risks involved in sailing to distant and barbarous places
(Hamilton, 1948).
3.2.1 Spanish trade to the colonies
Spanish trade with the colonies, molded on the mercantilistic tradition, had the
following characteristics: First, it restricted the number of actors who could officially
engage in this activity. For instance, only “official fleets” were allowed to enter and
leave Spanish ports. By decree, territories under Spanish rule were obliged to buy and
sell only from authorized Spanish merchant houses; thereby, direct trade between the
colonies and other foreign powers was considered illicit (Christelow, 1942). These re-
strictions were meant to guarantee favorable terms of exchange and rent accumulation,
thus making trade highly profitable for a select group of merchants in the metropolis.
Second, along with limiting the number of actors involved, it also limited desig-
nated “ports of entry”, and goods were heavily taxed upon arrival. Ships coming
directly from Spain were only allowed to arrive in major ports, where they had to
pay royal and municipal duties. Goods were then shipped from major to minor ports,
only paying municipal duties in the latter. According to historical records presented
by Walton (1810), duties on entry were equivalent to 9.5 percent for Spanish goods.
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Foreign goods had higher charges: They paid 15 percent when arriving in Spain, 10
percent for being re-shipped and 7 percent as royal duty on entry, “besides municipal
and other duties, which altogether amount to about 45 per cent” (Walton, 1810, p.
161). Export goods from the colonies, in turn, also had different customs treatment
depending on the importing European country.5
All major aspects of trade were regulated by the House of Trade, which was first
established in Seville in 1503, and then moved to Cadiz in 1717. Trade, navigation
and migration licenses to America had to be requested there and all ships were to be
rigorously inspected by Spanish officials upon returning to Spain (Hamilton, 1948).
3.2.2 Contraband trade
The natural consequences of this strict regulation was the emergence of a highly
lucrative contraband trade. According to the British naval commander Sir John Nar-
borough, “. . . the inhabitants of Chile had silver buckles to their belts and golden
hilts to their swords but lacked the commonest of European manufactures” (Sir John
Narborough’s Voyage to the South Sea: 85-87, cited by Christelow (1942: 311)), thus
highlighting the numerous opportunities for those willing to engage in this business.
As already mentioned, Spanish customs tariffs were responsible for extremely high
prices of foreign goods. Foreign traders could not only offer goods at much lower
prices if avoiding the legal course through Spain, but they could obtain a much higher
profit rate, equivalent to that of the Spanish exporter in Cadiz (Walton, 1810). There-
fore, as reported by Brown (1926), foreign traders never had difficulties in selling their
goods, even more considering that they also sold on credit.
The considerable extent of smuggling during the Spanish colonial period is well-
known.6 Although there are no precise numbers for the volume of goods smuggled,
there is evidence that foreign goods coming to Spanish colonies, both legal and con-
traband, exceeded by a large amount Spanish goods. At the beginning of the 19th
century, colonies had larger deficits in their foreign trade7 than in trade with Spain.
Considering only trade with neutral ships, money outflows in 1807 amounted to 19.3
million pesos, as opposed to 15.8 million pesos flowing on average to Spain in the
peace years 1802-1804 (Cuenca-Esteban, 1981).
5Llama, vicuña and sheep’s wools were, for example, duty-free if they were sent to Spain, whereas
they bore heavy taxes when shipped to a foreign country (Walton, 1810).
6See, among others, Brown(1926), Brown(1928), Nettels(1931), Goebel(1938) and Christelow(1942).
7Foreign trade refers to commerce with places other than Spain.
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Contraband trade was greatly facilitated by the role played by foreign actors, such
as Britain. Throughout the colonial period, British law constantly sought to foster
and legitimize trade between the British West Indies and Spanish colonies, yet, such
attempts were labeled as contraband and punished as a crime by Spanish officials.
There is evidence that the large contraband trade carried by these British colonies dur-
ing the first half of the 18th century was useful in undermining the Spanish monopoly
(Goebel, 1938).
Wars in Europe also increased the value of contraband trade and provided further
incentives to foreign merchants to engage in it. For instance, during the war between
England and Spain in 1796 and the English blockade, trade was closed between their
colonial ports and, therefore, commercial intrusion was needed by the British in order
to secure metals and essential commodities for their colonies. Until the end of the
Napoleonic Wars, communication and trade between Spain and its colonies was also
frequently disrupted, of which the British took commercial advantage by meeting the
increasing demands for goods among Spanish colonies (Goebel, 1938).
The Spanish Crown was well aware of these contraband activities and sought to
counteract them in the following ways. First, channeling trade through few ports in
order to ease the control of goods’ flows and the enforcement of tax payment. Second,
the Spanish government also conducted random searches of foreign vessels in the
Caribbean, and maintained the presence of guarda costas or coast guards at all times
in the region (Hamilton, 1948; Goebel, 1938). Despite such efforts, contraband trade
was a lucrative business in the Americas during the whole period of restrictive trade
and even in the late colonial period of the 18th century when trade was freed under
Bourbon rule.
In addition to these limited measures, corruption among Spanish officials made
smuggling possible in royal ports (Goebel, 1938; Brown, 1926; Walton, 1810). Spanish
officials were eager to share profits or receive bribes in exchange of which they would
supply false certificates, give assistance or “. . . close their eyes to the illicit introduction
of English goods” (Brown, 1926, p. 665).
Aside from bribes, other practices linked to the South Sea Company, who was
granted a trade monopoly by the English crown, were false measurements and exces-
sive crowding of ships with permits,8 charging goods on packet-boats only intended
for slaves, and allowing its employees to individually trade, otherwise “sailors refused
8Goods offered for sale were measured by colonial officials as the ship’s full load, while they were
usually one third or less than the total charge (Brown, 1926).
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to sail with captains who ventured to restrict their commercial activities” (Brown, 1926,
p. 671). Similarly, boats loaded with contraband goods would follow licensed vessels
until these have consumed their supplies, so that smuggled goods could then be trans-
ferred. English warships could also escort illegal vessels until they were safe, where
it was customary that captains of such warships received a percentage of the profits
of contraband trade. Finally, there is evidence that contraband trade was even carried
out in camps of mines, where English traders could receive gold or silver before the
legal fifth tax (Brown, 1926).
3.2.3 New Spain
Veracruz in the Gulf of Mexico, Acapulco in the Pacific and Campeche close to the
Yucatan peninsula were New Spain’s major ports. They were the only fortified ports
in that colony built to withstand multiple pirate attacks to the city or defend merchant
boats stationed there. Other coastal places not protected by forts were subject to raids;
nevertheless, the likelihood that raids were a main piracy activity should have dimin-
ished over time. Settlements and towns were increasingly built in, or even moved
to places at a considerable distance inland. “[This was] perhaps a result of repeated
orders to leave the coast uninhabited and thus reduce the incentive for piratical incur-
sions” (Gerhard, 1993, p.81). Yet, this early depopulation policy in the coastal areas
did not put an end to piracy, since deserted coasts were left exposed to contraband
activity (Gerhard, 1993).
The most important colonial port was that of Veracruz, which held the monopoly
of shipments going to and from Spain during three hundred years. To illustrate the
magnitude of its importance, between 1540 to 1650, Veracruz controlled 85% of the
volume of exports from the Americas (including Peru) (Chaunu, 1960). The munici-
pality of Veracruz was the first one founded in continental America (circa 1519), even
before the conquest of Mexico was completed in 1521. This port, together with that of
Campeche, was one of the most exposed to pirate activity due to its direct access for
ships coming from Europe as well as to the numerous islands of the Caribbean, where
a number of pirates were sheltered.9 Figure 3.1 below shows the routes used by John
Hawkins, British naval commander, to smuggle goods to the colonies and traffic with
African slaves while in the Caribbean-Veracruz area in the 17th century.
9Despite the presence of pirates, Spanish colonial institutions were predominant in Veracruz,
Campeche and Acapulco and trade was developed due to them. These ports will be thus only con-
sidered Spanish-treated in our empirical analysis.
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Figure 3.1: Pirate Routes: John Hawkins
Source: Lombardi (1983:42).
The second most important port, Acapulco, was designated the exclusive point of
exchange from the Americas to the Spanish colonies in Asia (Gerhard, 1993), princi-
pally due to its privileged geography (Yuste, 1992; Miranda, 1994). Such assignment
occurred around the mid 16th century and remained in place until the end of the colo-
nial period.10 Figure 3.2 below shows the two officially sanctioned trade routes from
Spain to Veracruz and further to Acapulco, which would then leave to the Philippines
in Asia.
10Guatulco, on the Pacific, was a main Spanish port in the early colonization period, however, Acapulco
took its place in 1573. The Guatulco bay, as many others, continued to be used for smuggling activities
(Gerhard, 1993).
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Figure 3.2: Official Trade Routes
Source: Lombardi (1983: 35).
Finally, Campeche was the third colonial port, mainly devoted to the export of
goods from the Yucatan Peninsula abroad. Due to its location, it was also frequently
“visited” by pirates, although contraband trade specially blossomed in the mid 18th
century just prior to independence.
After independence in 1821, the country lived a period of high political instabil-
ity, during which colonial ports were recurrently seized by one insurgent group or
another as a way to collect taxes on incoming merchandise and finance war activi-
ties (Miranda, 1994). Undoubtedly, these events severely hampered their functioning
throughout much of the 19th century, thus undermining the commercial monopoly
and importance of Acapulco in the Pacific and Veracruz in the Gulf of Mexico. A
number of other ports would gain prominence during this period.
3.3 The data
Data in this paper comes from several sources. In terms of the outcome of inter-
est, we use different measures of public goods provision, tax collection and poverty
at the municipal level in Mexico. Mexican municipalities amount to 2456 and they
are distributed along 32 states; 17 of them are coastal states, which comprise 1535
municipalities. Measures of municipal poverty and percentage of the population lack-
ing basic utilities in 2010 come from CONEVAL (Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la
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Polı́tica de Desarrollo Social)11, which tracks the performance of social policies across
Mexico. In addition, measures on average tax collection (municipal tax income) per
capita in 1995-2010, the length of roads as a share of municipal surface, and the num-
ber of agents at the Public Prosecution Office per 100 thousand inhabitants in 2010 are
provided by INEGI (Instituto Nacional de Estadı́stica y Geografı́a)12.
The key explanatory variables are indicators capturing whether trade in a given
place was conducted under Spanish institutions or rather based on informal smug-
gling arrangements. Spanish presence is coded from historical sources of maritime
ports in colonial Mexico. These locations are reported by Gerhardt (1993), from which
we also code Spanish colonial towns in general (whether used as ports or not). In
addition, we identify those places in which contraband trade was rampant due to the
presence of professional smugglers or pirates. The location of these ports is coded
from historical accounts on the presence of pirates on both coasts of Mexico. On the
Pacific side, detailed accounts on the presence of piracy are provided by Gerhardt
(1990) starting in the 16th until the 18th century, while in the Caribbean -Gulf of
Mexico- side the main sources come from regional histories (Alsedo y Herrera (1883);
Muñoz (2007, 2004)).
As a result, we identify 34 main ports or areas in which goods where exchanged
during colonial times either legally, as in the royal ports of Acapulco, Campeche and
Veracruz, or illegally via non-official ports (e.g. Banderas Bay or Bahia de Banderas,
now close to Puerto Vallarta). Although there is also evidence of contraband trade
filtering royal ports due to corruption, royal ports will be considered Spanish-treated
(and not treated by pirates), given the clear dominance of Spanish state institutions on
trade in these places. A visual representation of the main treated areas is provided
below in Figure 3.3, which portrays the regional distribution of all known points of
entry of merchant goods (legal or not).
11http://www.coneval.gob.mx
12http://www.inegi.org.mx/
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Figure 3.3: Points of Trade (Legal and Illegal)
Note: Identified points of trade belong to the former New Spain. Points inland indicate that they were
accessed through rivers from the sea.
It is of great importance in our empirical strategy to compare treated ports with
places that are most similar in a number of observed and unobserved covariates. To
do so, we identify municipalities in the vicinity, namely, that fall within a radius of
100, 50 or 20 kilometers from each treated port. These neighboring regions, as well as
their comprised municipalities are shown in figures 3.4 and 3.5.
Figure 3.4: Vicinities around treated Figure 3.5: Neighboring municipalities
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Aside from historical sources on pirate activity and official colonial ports, we sep-
arately identify the universe of natural harbors along Mexican coastlines as an exoge-
nous measure of the possibility to trade. We determine the location of natural harbors
by the presence of water inlets, bays, estuaries or river mouths on the coastline. Fol-
lowing this approach, which goes in line with Jha (2013),13 we identify 226 natural
harbors for all of Mexico (not just New Spain), which could have plausibly provided
natural protection to mercantile activities. These harbors are distributed along 82 mu-
nicipalities (out of 152 coastal municipalities), and they constitute our set of ‘all natural
harbors’.
Additionally, following Gaikwad (2015), we place restrictions on the suitability
of harbors based on the relative elevation of the surrounding territory. Mountainous
topography around harbors, more than any other feature necessary in modern times to
safely navigate harbors (e.g. water depth), was crucial for storing ships as it furnished
shelter from winds and bad weather (Gaikwad, 2015). Hence, we define a subset of
‘protected natural harbors’ as follows: for each detected natural harbor we calculate
the mean terrain elevation within 10 kilometers radial distance from the coastline.
If elevation is above the 30th percentile of elevation among all natural harbors, this
place is considered a ‘protected natural harbor’ in our main analyses. We further
consider harbors with elevation above the median in the Appendix in order to verify
our results. Figures 3.6 and 3.7 show the distribution of our sets of protected natural
harbors, which are present along 51 municipalities considering those above the 30th
percentile of elevation, and along 26 municipalities regarding those with surrounding
elevation above the median.
13Our procedure is slightly different since Jha (2013) relies on all natural indentations or water bodies
within 10 kilometers of the coastline as potential medieval harbors, whereas we require that water bodies
are connected with the sea.
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Figure 3.6: Harbors above 30th pct eleva-
tion
Figure 3.7: Harbors above median eleva-
tion
Finally, we also observe current maritime ports in Mexico. This information is ob-
tained from the Mexican state office for communications and transport –SCT (Secretarı́a
de Comunicaciones y Transportes). Present ports are distributed along 71 municipalities,
22 of which were treated in the colonial period.
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics of the different variables mentioned in this
section for municipalities in coastal states and considering treatment status.14
[Table 3.1 here]
3.4 Empirical strategy
Overseas trade in colonial Mexico was either legally performed under colonial
rule, or obtained via extra-legal means under the presence of pirates. The underlying
institutions established under these two scenarios implied markedly different degrees
of state capacity, compliance of the law, and thus a different market structure and
social organization around trade. Because of the importance of this economic activity
during the colonial period in places used as maritime ports, and the length of the
presence of these institutions, we put forward the following hypotheses: 1) Spanish
colonial rule on trade and piracy had important long run effects on development; 2)
these effects should differ according to the initial levels of state capacity established
by these institutions.
14Table 3.8 in the Appendix reports descriptive statistics for municipalities directly on the coastline
(panel A) and for all Mexican municipalities (panel B).
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We identify municipalities in Mexico that became Spanish or pirate ports, and
define two treatments, respectively. The estimation of the treatment effects is not
straightforward, since it is likely that these ports were not chosen at random. Sev-
eral pre-conquest or pre-treatment characteristics that can affect future development
might have explained the selection of these places as trade ports. Proximity to native
labor force and natural resources may have been such driving forces. As a result, ran-
domization of the treatment is only possible among places that shared pre-treatment
characteristics.
3.4.1 Linear model with vicinity fixed effects
Our first strategy to allow for this quasi-experimental setting is to control for com-
mon observed and unobserved characteristics at the vicinity level. For each treated
municipality we find its close neighbors within different radii of geodetic distances,
namely 20, 50 and 100 km.15 We then introduce vicinity fixed effects at a given dis-
tance, being able to compare each treated municipality with its neighbors.16 Neighbor-
ing municipalities in Mexico do not only share pre-treatment conditions as population
and geographic features, but they still share today cultural traits, federal laws and
institutions, labor markets, among other factors. The idea for having several distances
is to observe the sensitivity of our estimates to neighboring areas of different sizes,
where smaller vicinities comprise arguably more homogeneous municipalities.
Our baseline model is given by:
Yij = ηj + β Spanish portij + γ Pirate portij + θ colonial townij + εij (3.1)
where Yij is an outcome variable for municipality i in vicinity j, ηj is a fixed ef-
fect for vicinity j, and colonial town takes the value of 1 if municipality i was a town
in the colonial period. Whether a place was a colonial town captures municipality-
specific features related to the size of settlements, development potential and the early
presence of a local state. As outcome variables we consider the mean municipality
tax income per capita in 1995-2010, and for year 2010, the share of poor individuals,
share of people with lack of basic utilities, ratio of the length of roads network over
15Our procedure provides at least one closest neighbor for each treated municipality regardless of its
radius of distance.
16Treated municipalities that are neighbors within 20 km distance have perfectly or almost perfectly
overlapping vicinities; in these cases, a single fixed effect is defined.
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municipal surface and number of agents at the Public Prosecution Office for each 100
thousand inhabitants.
3.4.2 Natural harbors approach
Even after controlling for common features at the vicinity level and the presence
of a colonial town, being pirate or Spanish treated could be related with municipality-
specific unobservables that might explain later outcomes. Our second strategy deals
with this concern by using a source of exogenous variation in the possibility to trade,
namely, the presence of a natural harbor.
Navigation relied in its origins on geographic characteristics in order to protect and
store ships and vessels. Shelter and safe anchorage were provided by natural harbors
and they were necessary features in order to access places on the coastline, stop at
these places, and load goods into (or unload goods from) vessels. This exogenous
condition for trade has been already used in other studies. Jha (2013) relies on natural
indentations or water bodies along the coastline, whereas Gaikwad (2015) focuses on
natural indentations protected by mountainous topography in their surroundings. We
use these two approaches in order to define our set of natural harbors, as well as one
subset of protected natural harbors.17
Being a natural harbor is thus now a condition for treatment, which significantly
restricts the number of treated municipalities.18 We argue that the presence of a natural
harbor induced the selection of a given place by its clear geographical advantages,
which are either unrelated to future development, or common to all natural harbors
(e.g. the possibility of maritime trade in the colonial period).19 Therefore, we compare
the restricted set of treated municipalities with all other natural-harbor municipalities
along Mexican coastlines that had the same likelihood to be chosen. That is: Among
natural harbors in the vicinity, the choice of any given one can be considered random.
In a baseline exercise, we estimate the following model among municipalities with
the presence of a natural harbor:
17See definition criteria in the previous section of the data.
18Treated municipalities are now 19, or 14 with the presence of a protected natural harbor, out of 34 in
the original sample.
19It can be safely claimed that natural harbors influenced trade since the colonial period, and not just
thereafter. In particular, the introduction of steamships in the 19th century increased the size of vessels,
which required port structures and greater depth in already active harbors. This infrastructure was also
increasingly built at other coastal places (not natural harbors), which made them suitable for trade.
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Yh = α + β Spanish porth + γ Pirate porth + θ colonial townh + εh (3.2)
Finally, as mentioned above, we consider the sample of natural-harbor (or protected-
natural-harbor) municipalities under our initial approach. That is:
Yhj = ηj + β Spanish porthj + γ Pirate porthj + θ colonial townhj + εhj (3.3)
where h denotes a natural-harbor (or protected-natural-harbor) municipality and j
denotes its vicinity.
3.5 Results and robustness checks
Estimates of model (3.1) are shown in Table 3.2 including all Mexican municipali-
ties, and in Table 3.3 including only municipalities in coastal states. The three panels
in each table correspond to different sizes of vicinities around treated places, which
determine vicinity fixed effects in each case (within 100 km, 50 km or 20 km distance).
We find robust results that the presence of Spanish and pirate ports is related to better
development outcomes in the long run (except for the lenght of roads when explained
by the presence of piracy). In particular, coefficients for both treatments are statis-
tically significant to explain less poverty, greater access to basic utilities and higher
municipal tax income per capita across less and more restrictive vicinity sizes.
Estimates among municipalities in coastal states, considering variation among neigh-
boring municipalities within a 100 km radius (Panel A in Table 3.3), indicate that being
a Spanish colonial port (pirate port) is significantly related to a 23.17 (11.83) percent-
age points lower share of poor individuals, to a 21.34 (15.93) percentage points lower
share of population lacking basic utilities and to a 0.17 (0.12) thousand mexican pesos
higher tax income per capita. The magnitude of these effects is important, equivalent
to 1.3 (0.66), 0.71 (0.53) and 1.45 (1.03) standard deviations of the respective dependent
variables.
The Spanish treatment is in general associated with a greater number of agents at
the Public Prosecution Office per 100 thousand inhabitants, although this relationship
is not significant. On the other hand, the presence of a pirate port is associated with a
lower availability of road infrastructure while a Spanish port has the opposite relation,
and this is robust to the different vicinity sizes.
[Table 3.2 here]
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[Table 3.3 here]
Results for the baseline exercise among natural harbors are reported in Table 3.4.
The first panel in the table restricts our original sample to all indentified natural har-
bors along Mexican coasts, whereas the second panel only considers natural harbors
protected by mountainous topography. Estimates for the treatments are similar across
panels and to those in previous tables, although piracy is no longer significant to
explain higher tax collection per capita. It is interesting to note that colonial towns
among natural harbors, after controlling for the ports treatments, are on average sig-
nificantly worse off in terms of poverty measures and tax income. Only road infras-
tructure seems to be positively related to the fact of being a town in the colonial period.
[Table 3.4 here]
Table 3.5 further includes vicinity fixed effects at a 100 km radius from each treated
natural harbor.20 Results lead to the same conclusions as before: Spanish and pirate
harbors in the colonial period are today less poor, have better access to basic utilities
and a larger municipal taxing capacity. Royal harbors display a greater presence of
the state, whereas current road infrastructure is on average lower in former pirate
harbors.21
One difference is worth noting here. Whereas significance of the coefficients is
robust in almost all cases, magnitudes relating to poverty measures are now smaller,
and this drop is particularly clear for the Spanish treatment effect. This suggests a pos-
sible upward bias in our initial estimates with all municipalities in coastal states (or
all Mexican municipalities), which was corrected by limiting the comparison between
treatment and control group to close-neighboring natural harbors that had arguably
the same likelihood to be chosen.22 This potential bias would be consistent with the in-
tuition that Spanish colonizers, acting under the colonial state guarantee, could choose
the best places for carrying out trade. On the other hand, pirates, who were perform-
20For some 50 km vicinities there is no variation or even no neighboring harbors. Estimates using this
vicinity size support results explained here, and they are presented in the Appendix (Table 3.9, panels A
and B), despite the fact that the presence of many treated harbors will be captured by the vicinity fixed
effects.
21Table 3.10 in the Appendix uses elevation above the median of all harbors as criterion for defining
protected natural harbors.
22Magnitudes of the Spanish treatment effect are still important. In the most conservative estimates,
this effect is between 0.54 and 1.3 standard deviations of the dependent variables.
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ing an illegal and hidden activity, were less able to choose, and their selection for
trading ports was more likely random.
[Table 3.5 here]
In the following we seek to understand these findings by discussing relevant chan-
nels or direct consequences of the two treatments.
State institutions, trade and market structure
Results above indicate a significant and positive effect of Spanish and pirate ports
on current development outcomes. These results are rather surprising taking into
account that piracy ports were characterized, under the best scenario, by the presence
of an unruled activity around contraband trade. This is not only a sign of the weakness
or absolute absence of the state, with its implications for public goods provision, but
indeed, of the existence of a social organization against the law. It is important to note,
however, several factors: First, the difference in the magnitude of the two treatment
effects; second, the role of trade, which came as a consequence of the presence of both
Spanish and pirates; and third, the differences in the way that this economic activity
was developed as a consequence of having state institutions that enforced a trade
monopoly vs. informal institutions seeking to overcome this monopolistic structure.
All tables mentioned above report p-values from a test of the equality in coefficients
for both treatments. They indicate a significant lower magnitude of the piracy treat-
ment effect relative to the Spanish effect in most cases if we are not limited to natural
harbors. Among natural harbors this significant difference is not so clear, although
point estimates are in general smaller for the piracy treatment. This lower effect, even
though going in the same direction, is consistent with the idea that pirate ports should
have established unfavorable conditions for the development of state institutions in
comparison with Spanish ports. Well established state institutions, as those given by
the Spanish treatment, should have induced a higher taxing capacity and thus a larger
possibility for public goods provision, either during the colonial period or afterwards.
On the other hand, state institutions can provide a legal framework and certainty to
economic activity.
It is worth noting again that the presence of piracy is not significantly (if significant,
negatively) related to some state presence outcomes as road infrastructure and number
of agents at the Public Prosecution Office relative to population, for which the presence
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of a Spanish port is positively associated. Thus, whereas the presence of piracy may
have led to less poverty, state presence outcomes are not so clearly affected.
Piracy as a driver of higher long run development is still an interesting finding.
This result gives a strong support to the long term impact of trade, indicating that
the early development of this activity in the colonial period, either legally or not,
had persistent positive consequences on economic growth. Even in the absence of a
formal state and law enforcement, pirate ports were perhaps more thriving than places
without direct access to trade. Thereby, the early prosperity given by trade, in the first
place, may have brought pirate ports into a path of higher economic growth.
More important, however, is to observe the distinct way how trade was performed
by Spanish and pirates. A key factor can help us understand the piracy effect: Piracy
came along with the efficiency gains of free trade. Whereas Spanish colonial trade
was characterized by a strict monopoly, which gave huge power to few merchants
and limited consumption due to extreme high prices for goods (Hamilton, 1948), the
presence of piracy in the colonies might have fostered a merchant middle class that was
later important for economic growth. Therefore, free trade leading to a considerable
volume of trade and consumption, as well as to a broader bourgeois class, may have
offset the lack of state capacity, law and order.
3.5.1 Robustness checks
Current trade
It could be argued that current maritime ports share more common characteristics
today than natural harbors. These characteristics, as well as the fact of being a current
port, can be of course endogenous to the treatments; however, we can cross-check
our results by restricting the sample to present port municipalities in Mexico. Results
for model (3.1) among maritime ports today are shown in Table 3.6, and conclusions
remain robust: Those ports with a colonial history of trade of any kind are significantly
better off today, where the Spanish effect is larger.23
[Table 3.6 here]
This exercise provides further insights on the mechanisms operating in the long
run. It can be then claimed that the positive effects of Spanish and pirates’ ports are
23See Panel C in Table 3.9 for vicinity fixed effects within 50 km.
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not driven by the mechanical fact that many of these places carry out trade today (as
any other port in Mexico). Hence, there may be other important mechanisms at play,
which emerged from the early development of trade, that can account for these dif-
ferences in current outcomes, even among places where trade is the main economic
activity.
Correcting for a potential measurement error in piracy
Although historical records are very detailed in the location of piracy in New Spain,
we might be concerned that these records are not exhaustive, precisely because of the
illegal and hidden character of this activity.
In order to correct for this potential measurement error, we employ an IV strategy
relying on the presence of a protected natural harbor as an instrument. As previously
discussed, geographical features of natural harbors provided necessary conditions for
trade, allowing the entrance, shelter and store of ships. These features were of par-
ticular importance five centuries ago, when sophisticated port infrastructure was not
available, and part of it was not even needed given the smaller size and tonnage of
ships.
The particular combination of geographical features making a natural harbor is
not related to any factor determining development, except for the possibility in the
past to access continental places from the sea and thereby the possibility of exchange.
Therefore, natural harbors should have affected current outcomes only through their
effect on historical trade and on the arrival of vessels in an early period.24
In order to properly predict the piracy treatment with the presence of a protected
natural harbor, we exclude Spanish royal ports from the first stage.25 IV estimates are
presented in Table 3.7. The first stage is reported for each sample size (which slightly
varies across dependent variables) in columns (1), (4), (6) and (8), and we can verify
that the presence of a protected natural harbor is a strong predictor of piracy ports. IV
estimates lead to the same conclusions as before, except for the realtive magnitude of
the piracy treatment effect. It is now larger than the effect of the presence of a Spanish
port.
24We are not aware of any reported evidence of arrival of ships and vessels in Mexico before the
colonial period.
25A protected natural harbor will then only predict the presence of trade in those harbors, for which
the absence of royal ports is known; i.e. it will predict the presence of piratical commercial activities.
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[Table 3.7 here]
These results further support the importance of having access to free trade in the
past. The consequences of this trade are, according to these estimates, even bigger than
those from trade under the control of state institutions, provided that these institutions
fostered a monopolistic market structure.
3.6 Conclusion
Despite existing evidence for the long term impact of overseas trade, the role of
state institutions accompanying commercial activities has not been extensively stud-
ied. This paper examines the long run effect on development of overseas trade in colo-
nial Mexico conducted under two institutional arrangements, namely, Spanish rule
and pirates. We use historical records on the location of piracy and Spanish ports in
New Spain (now Mexico), identify natural harbors along Mexican coasts as a source
of exogenous variation in the possibility to trade, and compare harbors in the close
neighborhood.
We find that being a Spanish or pirate port in the colonial period significantly led
to better development outcomes in terms of poverty measures and municipal taxing
capacity today, which are not driven by the fact of carrying out trade in the present.
The positive piracy effect, although in some cases lower than the Spanish, is inter-
preted as a strong support to the long term impact of trade, was it developed legally
or not. We further argue that free trade underlying piracy activities, as opposed to a
trade monopoly under Spanish rule, may have led to an important volume of traded
goods and consumption, as well as to a broader merchant middle class.
State institutions provided by the presence of royal ports should have had an im-
portant long run effect, even though they were protecting a trade monopoly. They
should have increased capacity for public goods provision, either during the colonial
period or afterwards. On the other hand, state institutions supplied a legal framework
as well as certainty to economic activity. This role is consistent with the finding that the
presence of Spanish colonial ports is positively related with state capacity outcomes,
for which a negative or not significant relationship can be established with piracy.
Our paper shows that overseas trade substantialy influenced Spanish colonies’
later development. Piracy, although not classifiable as a formal colonial institution,
was spread throughout Spanish America and emerged as a result of a rigid trade
monopoly. Therefore, this study contributes not only to the understanding of hetero-
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geneous legacies from colonial activities, but also to the knowledge of important long
run effects of de facto institutions.
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Tables
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for municipalities in coastal states
No treated Spanish port Pirate port All obs.
Obs mean sd Obs mean sd Obs mean sd Obs mean sd
percentage of poor 1501 71.13 17.68 3 39.23 10.92 31 53.66 15.08 1535 70.71 17.84
percentage with lack of
basic utilities
1501 57.68 30.06 3 19.87 14.80 31 31.39 20.99 1535 57.07 30.15
municipal tax income
per capita
1474 0.05 0.11 3 0.19 0.10 31 0.20 0.34 1508 0.05 0.12
length roads/surface* 818 0.33 0.34 3 0.40 0.31 26 0.22 0.13 847 0.33 0.33
agents prosecution office
per 100 thousand people
1498 3.77 36.15 3 12.34 6.93 31 8.16 5.36 1532 3.88 35.76
colonial town 1501 0.25 0.43 3 1.00 0.00 31 0.55 0.51 1535 0.26 0.44
presence natural harbor 1501 0.04 0.20 3 0.67 0.58 31 0.55 0.51 1535 0.05 0.22
presence harbor above
30th pct elevation
1501 0.02 0.16 3 0.67 0.58 31 0.39 0.50 1535 0.03 0.18
presence harbor above
median elevation
1501 0.01 0.11 3 0.33 0.58 31 0.19 0.40 1535 0.02 0.13
presence current port 1501 0.03 0.18 3 1.00 0.00 31 0.61 0.50 1535 0.05 0.21
Notes: *Difference in means between Spanish and pirate ports is significant at the 10% level.
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Table 3.2: Linear model with vicinity fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
% of poor % with lack municipal tax length roads/ agents prosecution office
of basic utilities income per capita surface per 100 thousand people
Panel A: Vicinities within 100 km
spanish port -22.955*** -20.685** 0.169*** 0.043 5.351
(5.147) (10.449) (0.051) (0.094) (3.722)
pirate port -12.390*** -17.042*** 0.124*** -0.055* 2.387*
(2.714) (3.751) (0.032) (0.028) (1.365)
colonial town 0.881 -0.604 -0.011*** 0.154*** 2.807
(0.715) (1.208) (0.004) (0.027) (2.133)
p-value test [0.06] [0.74] [0.44] [0.31] [0.41]
spanish=pirate
Panel B: Vicinities within 50 km
spanish port -28.310*** -30.679*** 0.201*** 0.154 6.256**
(3.997) (6.466) (0.048) (0.124) (2.875)
pirate port -10.477*** -13.261*** 0.111*** -0.059** 2.085
(2.356) (3.891) (0.028) (0.030) (1.376)
colonial town 0.564 -0.868 -0.011*** 0.145*** 2.731
(0.750) (1.291) (0.004) (0.025) (2.024)
p-value test [0.00] [0.02] [0.09] [0.08] [0.13]
spanish=pirate
Panel C: Vicinities within 20 km
spanish port -21.545*** -23.922*** 0.164** 0.084 4.804
(4.475) (7.834) (0.070) (0.101) (3.182)
pirate port -6.522*** -9.052*** 0.117*** -0.088*** -0.578
(2.293) (3.448) (0.034) (0.027) (1.614)
colonial town 0.876 -0.530 -0.011*** 0.140*** 2.675
(0.759) (1.317) (0.004) (0.025) (2.008)
p-value test [0.00] [0.07] [0.52] [0.08] [0.07]
spanish=pirate
Observations 2456 2456 2412 1535 2415
Mean dependent 67.42 48.82 0.06 0.37 4.01
variable
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p− value < 0.10; ** p− value < 0.05; *** p− value < 0.01.
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Table 3.3: Linear model with vicinity fixed effects among municipalities in coastal states
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
% of poor % with lack municipal tax length roads/ agents prosecution office
of basic utilities income per capita surface per 100 thousand people
Panel A: Vicinities within 100 km
spanish port -23.171*** -21.339*** 0.174*** 0.180** 4.183
(4.316) (8.098) (0.051) (0.085) (4.517)
pirate port -11.826*** -15.930*** 0.124*** -0.009 1.667
(2.736) (3.874) (0.033) (0.023) (1.826)
colonial town -0.412 -4.476*** -0.012*** -0.036* 4.807
(0.918) (1.638) (0.004) (0.020) (4.339)
p-value test [0.02] [0.53] [0.38] [0.03] [0.51]
spanish=pirate
Panel B: Vicinities within 50 km
spanish port -26.535*** -25.886*** 0.199*** 0.269** 4.912
(3.920) (5.787) (0.049) (0.119) (3.693)
pirate port -10.124*** -12.233*** 0.111*** -0.021 1.547
(2.388) (4.015) (0.028) (0.028) (1.697)
colonial town -0.764 -4.751*** -0.012*** -0.024 4.521
(0.972) (1.742) (0.004) (0.020) (3.858)
p-value test [0.00] [0.04] [0.09] [0.02] [0.28]
spanish=pirate
Panel C: Vicinities within 20 km
spanish port -19.743*** -18.546*** 0.163** 0.234*** 3.123
(4.220) (6.735) (0.070) (0.090) (4.208)
pirate port -6.412*** -8.416** 0.118*** -0.034 -1.152
(2.311) (3.485) (0.034) (0.029) (1.983)
colonial town -0.242 -4.310** -0.012*** -0.025 4.400
(0.982) (1.780) (0.004) (0.020) (3.762)
p-value test [0.00] [0.16] [0.54] [0.00] [0.20]
spanish=pirate
Observations 1535 1535 1508 847 1532
Mean dependent 70.71 57.07 0.05 0.33 3.88
variable
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p− value < 0.10; ** p− value < 0.05; *** p− value < 0.01.
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Table 3.4: Baseline model restricting the sample to natural harbors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
% of poor % with lack municipal tax length roads/ agents prosecution office
of basic utilities income per capita surface per 100 thousand people
Panel A: All natural harbors
spanish port -26.687*** -26.983** 0.201*** 0.247 5.380
(8.166) (11.504) (0.067) (0.159) (5.141)
pirate port -9.357*** -15.602*** 0.154 -0.016 1.721
(3.449) (4.785) (0.109) (0.043) (1.238)
colonial town 15.130*** 15.343** -0.199*** 0.084** -0.345
(3.552) (6.308) (0.068) (0.037) (1.364)
Observations 82 82 82 74 82
Mean dependent 54.83 35.93 0.20 0.23 7.10
variable
p-value test [0.04] [0.29] [0.63] [0.10] [0.48]
spanish=pirate
Panel B: Protected natural harbors
spanish port -25.955*** -23.734* 0.195*** 0.249 5.065
(8.493) (12.003) (0.066) (0.163) (5.288)
pirate port -8.500** -12.940** 0.154 0.026 1.585
(4.119) (5.677) (0.106) (0.058) (1.719)
colonial town 18.791*** 21.206*** -0.204*** 0.127*** -0.335
(4.339) (6.980) (0.068) (0.042) (1.669)
Observations 51 51 51 45 51
Mean dependent 53.50 31.20 0.19 0.22 7.45
variable
p-value test [0.04] [0.33] [0.67] [0.19] [0.52]
spanish=pirate
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p− value < 0.10; ** p− value < 0.05; *** p− value < 0.01.
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Table 3.5: Among natural harbors with vicinity fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
% of poor % with lack municipal tax length roads/ agents prosecution office
of basic utilities income per capita surface per 100 thousand people
Panel A: All natural harbors
spanish port -18.120*** -13.510 0.171** 0.205 7.295**
(5.517) (8.305) (0.072) (0.124) (3.629)
pirate port -9.790** -13.094** 0.191** -0.029 0.100
(4.044) (5.991) (0.074) (0.036) (1.373)
colonial town 14.053*** 18.054* -0.180*** 0.042 0.197
(4.710) (9.601) (0.065) (0.071) (1.068)
Observations 82 82 82 74 82
Mean dependent 54.83 35.93 0.20 0.23 7.10
variable
p-value test [0.26] [0.97] [0.83] [0.08] [0.06]
spanish=pirate
Panel B: Protected natural harbors
spanish port -16.032** -13.442 0.137* 0.260** 6.182
(6.686) (10.994) (0.080) (0.098) (3.775)
pirate port -9.129* -9.178 0.165** -0.024 -0.516
(5.166) (8.148) (0.072) (0.048) (2.026)
colonial town 18.750*** 24.476* -0.184*** 0.115 0.029
(6.276) (13.039) (0.064) (0.094) (1.404)
Observations 51 51 51 45 51
Mean dependent 53.50 31.20 0.19 0.22 7.45
variable
p-value test [0.47] [0.79] [0.79] [0.01] [0.11]
spanish=pirate
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Vicinity fixed effects within 100 km radius. * p− value < 0.10; **
p− value < 0.05; *** p− value < 0.01.
133
The Long Run Influence of Institutions Governing Trade
Table 3.6: Among current maritime ports with vicinity fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
% of poor % with lack municipal tax length roads/ agents prosecution office
of basic utilities income per capita surface per 100 thousand people
spanish port -41.551*** -65.201*** 0.585** 0.152* 10.684***
(9.384) (12.149) (0.255) (0.086) (3.416)
pirate port -10.762** -19.931*** 0.310** -0.001 1.961
(4.654) (6.163) (0.148) (0.054) (1.735)
colonial town 7.721 10.835* -0.337** -0.127* 0.196
(6.374) (6.334) (0.144) (0.072) (1.584)
Observations 71 71 71 65 71
Mean dependent 48.18 28.67 0.27 0.30 7.57
variable
p-value test [0.00] [0.00] [0.10] [0.03] [0.00]
spanish=pirate
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Vicinity fixed effects within 100 km radius. * p− value < 0.10; **
p− value < 0.05; *** p− value < 0.01.
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Table 3.7: IV estimates for piracy with vicinity fixed effects among municipalities in coastal states
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
First % of poor % with lack First municipal tax First length roads/ First agents prosecution office
stage of basic utilities stage income per capita stage surface stage per 100 thousand people
pirate port -61.296*** -88.222*** 0.593** -0.568** 9.683
(20.809) (29.744) (0.232) (0.251) (7.122)
protected 0.195*** 0.195*** 0.177*** 0.195***
natural harbor (0.056) (0.056) (0.058) (0.056)
spanish port -0.157 -31.337*** -33.272** -0.157 0.251*** -0.163 0.081 -0.156 5.504
(0.111) (8.782) (13.746) (0.111) (0.072) (0.120) (0.103) (0.111) (4.820)
colonial town 0.028*** 1.125 -2.230 0.028*** -0.027*** 0.042*** -0.012 0.028*** 4.557
(0.009) (1.148) (1.894) (0.009) (0.010) (0.016) (0.023) (0.009) (4.398)
Observations 1535 1535 1535 1508 1508 847 847 1532 1532
Mean dependent 0.02 70.71 57.07 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.33 0.02 3.88
variable
p-value test [0.12] [0.05] [0.09] [0.00] [0.44]
spanish=pirate
F stat for instrument 11.90 11.89 9.33 11.90
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Vicinity fixed effects within 100 km radius. * p− value < 0.10; ** p− value < 0.05; *** p− value < 0.01.
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Table 3.8: Descriptive statistics
No treated Spanish port Pirate port All obs.
Obs mean sd Obs mean sd Obs mean sd Obs mean sd
Panel A: Among municipalities on the coastline.
percentage of poor 127 59.09 18.26 3 39.23 10.92 22 52.89 14.84 152 57.80 17.95
percentage with lack of
basic utilities
127 42.72 27.31 3 19.87 14.80 22 29.40 18.11 152 40.34 26.49
municipal tax income
per capita
127 0.14 0.32 3 0.19 0.10 22 0.26 0.39 152 0.16 0.33
length roads/surface* 107 0.30 0.56 3 0.40 0.31 17 0.22 0.12 127 0.29 0.52
agents prosecution office
per 100 thousand people
127 5.49 5.23 3 12.34 6.93 22 7.53 4.68 152 5.92 5.28
colonial town 127 0.20 0.41 3 1.00 0.00 22 0.50 0.51 152 0.26 0.44
presence natural harbor 127 0.50 0.50 3 0.67 0.58 22 0.77 0.43 152 0.54 0.50
presence harbor above
30th pct elevation
127 0.29 0.46 3 0.67 0.58 22 0.55 0.51 152 0.34 0.47
presence harbor above
median elevation
127 0.15 0.36 3 0.33 0.58 22 0.27 0.46 152 0.17 0.38
presence current port 127 0.38 0.49 3 1.00 0.00 22 0.73 0.46 152 0.44 0.50
Panel B: Including all Mexican municipalities.
percentage of poor 2422 67.63 18.47 3 39.23 10.92 31 53.66 15.08 2456 67.42 18.52
percentage with lack of
basic utilities
2422 49.08 30.69 3 19.87 14.80 31 31.39 20.99 2456 48.82 30.65
municipal tax income
per capita
2378 0.06 0.12 3 0.19 0.10 31 0.20 0.34 2412 0.06 0.12
length roads/surface* 1506 0.37 0.40 3 0.40 0.31 26 0.22 0.13 1535 0.37 0.39
agents prosecution office
per 100 thousand people
2381 3.94 29.32 3 12.34 6.93 31 8.16 5.36 2415 4.01 29.12
colonial town 2422 0.29 0.45 3 1 0 31 0.55 0.51 2456 0.29 0.46
presence natural harbor 2422 0.03 0.16 3 0.67 0.58 31 0.55 0.51 2456 0.03 0.18
presence harbor above
30th pct elevation
2422 0.02 0.12 3 0.67 0.58 31 0.39 0.50 2456 0.02 0.14
presence harbor above
median elevation
2422 0.01 0.09 3 0.33 0.58 31 0.19 0.40 2456 0.01 0.10
presence current port 2422 0.02 0.14 3 1 0 31 0.61 0.50 2456 0.03 0.17
Notes: *Difference in means between Spanish and pirate ports is significant at the 10% level.
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Table 3.9: Restricted samples with vicinity fixed effects (50 km)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
% of poor % with lack municipal tax length roads/ agents prosecution office
of basic utilities income per capita surface per 100 thousand people
Panel A: All natural harbors
spanish port -14.886*** -11.871** 0.177*** 0.203*** 6.195
(4.031) (5.574) (0.054) (0.061) (3.857)
pirate port -17.323*** -24.319*** 0.296*** -0.060 1.133
(5.429) (5.986) (0.090) (0.039) (1.917)
colonial town 15.003*** 11.133 -0.208*** 0.097** 1.054
(3.972) (8.976) (0.074) (0.047) (2.146)
Observations 82 82 82 74 82
Mean dependent 54.83 35.93 0.20 0.23 7.10
variable
p-value test [ 0.72] [ 0.13] [0.26] [0.00] [ 0.24]
spanish=pirate
Panel B: Protected natural harbors
spanish port -14.886*** -11.871* 0.177*** 0.203*** 6.195
(4.265) (5.898) (0.057) (0.065) (4.081)
pirate port -19.882*** -22.775*** 0.299** -0.094** 1.325
(6.028) (7.199) (0.115) (0.044) (3.052)
colonial town 20.223*** 20.532* -0.224*** 0.158*** 1.233
(4.788) (11.388) (0.063) (0.054) (2.676)
Observations 51 51 51 45 51
Mean dependent 53.50 31.20 0.19 0.22 7.45
variable
p-value test [0.50] [0.25] [0.35] [0.00] [0.35]
spanish=pirate
Panel C: Current maritime ports
spanish port -72.514*** -101.630*** 1.106*** 0.482 3.625
(9.841) (14.621) (0.264) (0.346) (5.522)
pirate port -12.898** -21.222** 0.421*** 0.062 -1.356
(5.801) (8.786) (0.118) (0.047) (2.093)
colonial town 15.342*** 7.134 -0.304*** -0.122 7.988**
(4.972) (5.632) (0.087) (0.100) (3.736)
Observations 71 71 71 65 71
Mean dependent 48.18 28.67 0.27 0.30 7.57
variable
p-value test [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.19] [0.24]
spanish=pirate
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p− value < 0.10; ** p− value < 0.05; *** p− value < 0.01.
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Table 3.10: Among protected natural harbors with elevation above median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
% of poor % with lack municipal tax length roads/ agents prosecution office
of basic utilities income per capita surface per 100 thousand people
Panel A: Baseline model
spanish port -17.427*** -2.181 0.325*** 0.088** 9.832**
(4.344) (10.193) (0.085) (0.036) (3.574)
pirate port -11.210*** -7.433 0.326* 0.035 1.338
(3.713) (8.309) (0.189) (0.055) (3.299)
colonial town 26.750*** 23.296** -0.323** 0.108** 0.284
(4.783) (9.609) (0.121) (0.042) (3.553)
p-value test [0.02] [0.44] [0.99] [0.27] [0.00]
spanish=pirate
Panel B: With vicinity fixed effects (100 km)
spanish port -9.748** 20.779*** 0.270*** 0.091* 14.693***
(4.020) (3.191) (0.050) (0.051) (1.600)
pirate port -9.921** -11.772 0.322** 0.010 -0.482
(4.712) (8.982) (0.143) (0.052) (4.455)
colonial town 17.765*** 0.124 -0.247*** 0.109* -3.936*
(4.968) (3.802) (0.080) (0.058) (2.028)
p-value test [0.98] [0.00] [0.72] [0.21] [ 0.00]
spanish=pirate
Observations 26 26 26 22 26
Mean dependent 49.31 22.95 0.26 0.16 9.29
variable
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p− value < 0.10; ** p− value < 0.05; *** p− value < 0.01.
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Credencial Histórica (2001). Fundación de Ciudades y Poblaciones. Revista
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Diaz-Cayeros, A., & Jha, S. (2014). Can Contract Failures Foster Ethnic Assim-
ilation? Evidence from Cochineal in Mexico. Unpublished.
Duarte, J. (2003). Educación Pública y Clientelismo en Colombia. Medellı́n;
Editorial Universidad de Antioquia.
Durante, R. (2010). Climate Variability, Risk Sharing, and the Historical Emer-
gence of Generalized Trust: Evidence from European Regions. WP.
Engerman, S. L. and Sokoloff, K. L. (1997). Factor Endowments, Institutions,
and Differential Paths of Growth among New World Economies: A View from Eco-
nomic Historians of the United States. In Haber, S., editor, How Latin America Fell
Behind. Stanford University Press.
(2002). Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development
Among New World Economies. Working Paper 9259, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Feyrer, J. and Sacerdote, B. (2009). Colonialism and Modern Income: Islands
as Natural Experiments. Review of Economics and Statistics, 91(2):245-262.
Fowler, J. (2006). Altruism and Turnout. Journal of Politics, vol. 68(3), pages
674-683.
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Estrategia Económica y Financiera, July.
Mesa, J. M. (1906). Minas de Antioquia. Catálogo de las que se Han Titulado
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